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they've begun asking riddles-I believe I can guess that," she added
aloud.
"Do you mean you think you can find out the answer to it?" said
the March Hare.
"Exactly so," said Alice.
"Then you should say what you mean," the March Hare went
on.
"I do," Alice hastily replied; "at least-I mean what I say-
that's the same thing, you know."
LEWIS CARROLL, Alice's Adventures in Wonderland, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF
LEWIS CARROLL 75-76 (The Modem Library ed., 1984).
I. INTRODUCTION: OF PERVASIVE SECULARITY
The twentieth century has witnessed unimaginable cruelties: "The
[enlightenment's] cult of Reason ... replaced transcendence that was
worshiped and experienced in a religious manner."1 The replacement-
secularism-permitted the rise of a liberalism shorn of the humility
demanded by a belief in God. As a result, secularism could degenerate
into Nazism and Stalinism. "It is clear that the crisis of Reason leads
either to a temporary nihilism or a permanent need for transcendence." 2
The theologian David Novak agrees, adding a grim twist that transports
his fear to the sacred scroll on my front door: "[I]t can and should be
argued that modem secularism, with its explicit denial of any normative
transcendence, is a far more immediate condition making for the emer-
gence of Nazi nihilism than is traditional Christian ambivalence about
Jews."3 Others sound a correlative warning: "[I]n the aftermath of the
holocaust, one cannot simply speak; that discourse has been shattered by
the irruption of the holocaust into modem consciousness; that language
has been ruptured by the in-breaking of the holocaust into common
speech."4
It is at best difficult for some of us to maintain a belief in a personal
God without accepting God's occasional injustices.5 To entertain the
notion of a purely loving God without acknowledging this trait is to
deny the Holocaust. This we dare not do. To the contrary, the twentieth
century's periodic denials of a publicly and consensually acknowledged
transcendence reflect our understanding of God's mysterious ways and
1. Jean Daniel, God Is Not a Head of State, NEW PERSP. Q., Spring 1994, at 11-12.
2. Id.
3. DAVID NOVAK, JEWISH-CHRISTIAN DIALOGUE: A JEWISH JUSTIFICATION 5 (1989).
4. DAVID R. BLUMENTHAL, FACING THE ABUSING GOD: A THEOLOGY OF PROTEST 8 (1993)
(summarizing the work of Susan Shapiro).
5. See id. passim.
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this doleful history. When we append to these God-forsaken tendencies
the inclination of liberal societies to place an unjustified faith in the
potential of pure reason, we appreciate both the nearly universal percep-
tion that contemporary American society is itself out of kilter, and the
incommensurability of our many views on what to do about this loss of
balance. For even as we commemorate the liberation of the Nazi death
camps a half century ago, we despair our own spiritual malaise, reflected
in roughly equal parts of lost religion, morality and virtue, lost notions
of personal responsibility, and lost family and shared community values.
All such losses undermine our ability to oversee the proper upbringing
of future generations and thus risk the long term unity and stability of
our nation.6 Public education fails us, crime riddles and prevention
eludes us.7 Liberals demean our self-reliance, conservatives disparage
our interdependence, greed defines us, and poverty surrounds us. In cir-
cumstances so understood, one should register little surprise when mem-
bers of the legal academy find this spiritual decline traceable to the
demise of public religiosity and, in particular, to the one institution that
stands as the overseer of the legal profession: the United States
Supreme Court.
The rhetoric of imminent ruin has a familiar ring: Post-modem
American culture-including, not least, the Supreme Court-has priva-
tized and marginalized religious discussion in the "public square."8
Even commentators who find the supposed privatization of our religious
life consistent with the demands of a pluralistic, liberal democratic soci-
ety find it necessary to justify the marginalization based on the nature of
religion, 9 rather than the demands of heterodoxy. Proving the thesis that
6. I distinguish here between unity, which supposes some conceptual agreement about the
goods to which our society is committed, and stability, which comes ultimately at the end of a
bayonet.
7. See David J. Rothman, The Crime of Punishment, THE N.Y. REv. OF BOOKS, Feb. 17,
1994, at 34 (book review).
8. See, e.g., STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: How AMERICAN LAW AND
POLITICS TRIVIALuzE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION (1993); RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS, THE NAKED PUBLIC
SQUARE: RELIGION AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (2d ed. 1986); MICHAEL J. PERRY, LovE AND
POWER: THE ROLE OF RELIGION AND MORALITY IN AMERICAN POLITICS (1991) [hereinafter
PERRY, LOVE AND POWER]); W. Cole Durham, Jr. & Alexander Dushku, Traditionalism,
Secularism, and the Transformative Dimension of Religious Institutions, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REv.
421; Frederick Mark Gedicks, Public Life and Hostility to Religion, 78 VA. L. REv. 671 (1992)
[hereinafter Gedicks, Hostility]. There is an opposing position, but it has garnered less attention
of late. See, e.g., Theodore Y. Blumoff, The Holocaust and Public Discourse, 11 J.L. & RELiG.
591 (1994-95) [hereinafter Blumoff, Holocaust]; Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and Liberal
Democracy, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 195 (1992).
9. See generally, William P. Marshall, The Inequality of Anti-establishment, 1993 B.Y.U. L.
REv. 63; William P. Marshall, The Other Side of Religion, 44 HASTINGS L. J. 843 (1993)
[hereinafter Marshall, The Other Side]. But see RiChard Rorty, Religion as Conversation-Stopper,
3 COMMON KNOWLEDGE 1 (1994).
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a statement made often enough takes on a reality of its own, the received
wisdom posits a simple equation that explains our demise: "privatized,
ergo marginalized." But the reality of the calculation is questionable
and, in fact, belied by the religious character of the major public move-
ments in American history and certainly since World War II. Many
observers have mistaken their own rhetoric-and their own feelings of
alienation-with what in fact occurs in public life.
Privatization, properly understood, doubtless has occurred, but that
phenomenon, absolutely essential to the well being of a richly pluralistic
liberal democracy, has not now and never has been synonymous with
marginalization. The problem is that the causal relationship between
privatization and marginalization is more assumed than studied, resting
on oversimplified and unexamined premises that presume a definitional
equivalence between that which is necessarily and appropriately private,
and that which exists outside the margins of cultural and political impor-
tance. In the public arena itself, however, one hears multiple (and at
times cacophonous) voices that challenge the accuracy of the equation.
A moment's thought should make one wonder how striking it is,
from practical, theoretical and historical vantage points, that this nearly
formalistic equation ever took hold. That it holds sway within a sub-
stantial part of the academy-in light of the phenomenal rise, first, of
the Moral Majority and politico-televangelizers and, later, of the Chris-
tian Coalition and the patently enhanced authority, visibility and power
of advertently religious public figures-says far more about our isola-
tion in law schools"° than it does about the status of religion in the
American public life. Religious leaders in the last two decades have
bathed in the luster of the political limelight, advising Presidents and
legislatures, expanding for the foreseeable future the accepted range of
public responses to emotionally charged moral/religious issues, tugging
the entire political spectrum far to the right during the 1980s and 1990s,
and defining party platforms and politics." Even our current (liberal?)
Democratic President has reached out to mend fences with the armies of
politically organized "religi-cos."' 2 It is as if those who decry this sup-
posed marginalization missed the practices of the last three decades. 3
10. For the same reaction in a different context, see Mary Ann Glendon, What's Wrong With
the Elite Law Schools, WALL ST. J., June 8, 1993, at A16.
11. This was of course especially true during the Houston Convention of the Republican Party
in 1992. See CARTER, supra note 8, at 20, 23-24, 45-51.
12. See Fred Barnes, Rev. Bill, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 3, 1994, at 10, 11 (discussing
"Clinton's embrace of evangelicals").
13. My former colleague and close friend Professor Fred Gedicks first brought this inattention
to my notice. He has not yet explained it to my satisfaction. See generally Frederick Mark
Gedicks, Some Political Implications of Religious Belief, 4 NoTrEu DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB.
POLICY 419, 421 (1990) [hereinafter Gedicks, Political Implications] (contrasting religion in
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From the viewpoint of liberal theory, the equation denies our ori-
gins. Going back at least as far as Mill, among the hallmarks of liberal
theories has been the tendency to relegate that which is most important
to the private sphere.1 4 Many feminists, for example, deplore the
(admittedly contingent) border between private and public in domestic
relations precisely because it prevents state action in the area of domes-
tic violence, thereby shielding an important relationship from public
scrutiny. 15 Procreative rights-the decisions we make in and about con-
duct in our bedrooms-still retain a measure of instrumental "privacy,'
16
because of their importance. Even the most threatening political speech
evades state condemnation unless the dangers it presents are grave and
imminent.1 7 The scope of government has expanded exponentially in
the intervening century since Mill wrote, but still today American cul-
ture relegates many of its most important features to the home, family,
church and community, largely free from state regulation.
Apart from the practices and theories that raise serious questions
about the "New Religionists"' critiques, there is countervailing history.
Religion has always played a pivotal and defining role in American poli-
tics, despite the long prevailing "post-Modern" liberal ethos. 8 It will
continue to do so. But the call for more advertently religious talk in the
public discourse, as an antidote to this assumed marginalization, contin-
public debate as an interest group able to deliver a number of votes, and religion "qua religion",
and suggesting implicitly that only in the latter context does it "seek[] to provide a moral
reference to public policy debates").
14. See John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, in UTLITARIANISM ON LIBERTY ESSAY ON BENTHAM
126 (Mary Warnock ed., World Publishing Co. 1962) (1859). Mill takes a view of the private that
is self-regarding and largely free from state jurisdiction: "[T]he sole end for which mankind are
warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their
number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised
over any member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others." Id. at
135. Even when protection may be warranted, conditions for imposing force on the private realm
must be met: "As soon as any part of a person's conduct affects prejudicially their interests of
others, society has jurisdiction over it, and the question whether the general welfare will or will
not be promoted by interfering with it, becomes open to discussion." Id. at 205.
15. These views are carefully surveyed by Ruth Gavison, Feminism and the Public/Private
Distinction, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1, 35 (1992).
16. "Instrumental," as used in the text, has two meanings: First, it reflects the view that
privacy partakes of decisionmaking and, second, that the conduct or acts with respect to which
such decisions are made are, if we deem them private, presumptively entitled to remain free from
regulation. Consequently, the government bears a substantial burden of demonstrating why the
conduct or acts should not remain private. See id. at 7-9.
17. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
18. Castigating the liberal bogey for the "privatization of religious convictions," Professor
Perry asserts that liberals privatize "even ... prophetic convictions of the sort that have helped
inspire some of our most cherished movements for social change." PERRY, LovE AND POwER,
supra note 8, at 81. That certain liberal theorists have tried to minimize religion in politics surely
will not change our society; and the evidence for that conclusion is implicit in Professor Perry's
own quote.
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ues. If, as this Commentary will argue, "God-talk" enjoys a robust and
seeming omnipresence in our public life, we must inquire with some
precision what it is that the critics lament. The answer this essay pro-
vides is two-fold: (1) They demand a greater presence for the right-
appropriate-kind of religion, which for them is not, at least generally,
the religion of the contemporary, political-fundamentalist right; and (2)
they desire a greater share of power for that appropriate religion.
Beneath these goals lies an unstated and unexamined premise: Follow-
ing the Social Gospel strand of Protestantism that late nineteenth/early
twentieth century theologians wove into the American cultural fabric,
New Religionists of all political stripes simply assume that religion is
and must be allied fully with, and not against, the state. It is with that
premise that I take exception; in fact, it is with the over-abundance of
public religiosity that I forcefully take issue, for this overabundance
threatens true religion.
The Commentary that follows begins in Part II by examining the
claim of marginalization in three of its facets: (A) that religion has been
detrimentally "privatized" in contemporary American culture; (B) that
the "public square" has been cleansed-stripped "naked"-of religiosity
in our culture; and (C) that this has occurred because of the erroneous
supposition of epistemological superiority of secular reasoning over reli-
gious knowledge. The first two facets reflect hyperbole on their face;
we virtually swim in a sea of public religiosity. The latter claim, in
contrast, breaks down only upon close examination. Part III then offers
an alternative interpretation to what one might describe as the archetypal
case that underscores the supposed evil of privatization, Employment
Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith,19 an opinion that
has drawn the New Religionists' wrath. What is curious is that Smith is
as fully corrupt as the mountains of scorn heaped upon it would indicate,
but its corruption comes from its theological politics, which over-public-
"izes" religion. For this reason the decision gives the New Religionists
a large measure of what they purport to want, but at a price which they
are unwilling to pay because it undermines the heart of their critique.
The Commentary concludes in Part IV with a discussion of the
ever-present but unacknowledged theological politics that runs through
the writing of these new critics. The New Religionists of the political
left and right comprise the latest chorus for the songs of the Social Gos-
pel, threatening to realize the worst fear of the fundamentalist critics of
the original Social Gospelers: the absolute substitution of a public gos-
pel for the genuine article. Additionally, the section suggests that there
are alternatives, that there is today, as has there been since the founding
19. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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of the Republic, a powerful role for religion outside, or at least along-
side, the public square.
As Alice's tea party with the Mad Hatter continues, the Hatter
responds to Alice's apparent tendency to conflate "saying what you
mean," and "meaning what you say."
"Not the same thing a bit!" the Hatter said. "Why you might just
as well say that 'I see what I eat' is the same thing as 'I eat what I
see'y,20
The New Religionists suffer in much the same way as Alice: They all
mean what they say-that religion has been "marginalized;" there is lit-
tle disjunction between their intended articulation and the articulation
we receive. There is at least the hint of disjunction, however, between
their purpose and their articulation, for they fail to own what they
mean-that the marginalization they lament is largely theirs alone. As a
result, they pursue terribly worthy goals with less than worthy strategies;
for many remain hostage to the unavoidably opaque lenses that filter
through all of our respective religious traditions.
II. THE CLAIM OF MARGINALIZATION
Of the major moral debates that take place within our society, one
of the leading New Religionists, Professor Michael McConnell, asserts
that only religion is omitted.21 This phenomenon occurs, he laments,
because since Lemon v. Kurtzman22 mandated legislative secularity, reli-
gion has been "privatized and [therefore] marginalized."23 Another
member of the group, Professor Stephen Carter, concurs and goes far-
ther, describing religion as a "hobby": "The message of contemporary
culture seems to be that it is perfectly all right to believe that stuff-we
have freedom of conscience . . . -but you really ought to keep it to
yourself."'  Professor Michael Perry, in a forthcoming work, begins
with the unexamined premise that citizens in a democracy "have been
led to believe, or half believe, that they should keep their religion 'pri-
vate', that they should keep it not merely out of politics but out of public
20. LEWIS CARROLL, Alice's Adventures in Wonderland, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF LEWIS
CARROLL, 75-76 (The Modem Library ed. 1984).
21. See Michael W. McConnell, "God is Dead and We Have Killed Him!": Freedom of
Religion in the Post-modern Age, 1993 B.Y.U. L. Rv. 163, 180.
22. 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (holding, among other things, that a statute violates the
Establishment Clause, U.S. CoNsT. amend. I, unless it has a "secular legislative purpose... [and]
its principal or primary effect... neither advances nor inhibit religion").
23. McConnell, supra note 21, at 165.
24. CARTER, supra note 8, at 25. See also Kathleen M. Sullivan, God as a Lobby, 61 U. CHI.
L. REv. 1655, 1655 (1994) (reviewing STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: How
AMERICAN LAW AND PoLmcs TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION (1993)) (describing the thesis of
Carter's work as the belief that "religion is excessively marginalized in American public life").
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too.' 25
Others raise the stakes even higher, tracing to the Enlightenment's
ethos the idea that "some of the principal actors in American public life
systematically marginalize religious viewpoints."2 6
Under a Lockean po'litical regime, the reach of permissible gov-
emnment action (public life) depends on the boundaries of the inviola-
ble sphere of individual rights (private life).
Conceptually, the presence or absence of individual free will
marks the boundary between the public and private spheres. The divi-
sion of society into public and private spheres thus mirrors the funda-
mental division in Western thought between subject and object. In
private life, subjectivity and passion hold sway. Individuals are free
to do whatever they please for any reason (or no reason) as long as
they do not harm anyone else....
Public life, on the other hand, is the realm of objectivity and
reason. In this realm, government and individuals must serve the col-
lective "public interest" rather than the idiosyncratic tastes and pref-
erences of any individual. Value choices must be rationally defended
in public life, for unlike private actions, public actions cannot be jus-
tified by mere appeal to an individual's tastes or preferences.27
The themes identified, the liberal triumph of public over private,
and of secular (objective/rational) over religious (subjective/passion),
bleed into-and partially restate-others: the consequent privileging of
secular discourse in the "public square," a result which flows from the
supposed epistemic superiority of secular as opposed to religious dis-
course. Together these themes form the basis of the New Religionists'
reaction to and critique of contemporary American culture.
A. The Triumph of Public Over Private
Among the New Religionists' most forcefully stated critiques of
public culture is concern over the status of religion in American culture:
to a person they deplore the supposed fact that our culture has "priva-
tized" religion. Privatization has occurred, but the role of the Supreme
25. Michael J. Perry, Speaking Theologically in Public (forthcoming) (at ch. 2 at 7, on file
with the author) [hereinafter Perry, Speaking Theologically].
26. Gedicks, Hostility, supra note 8 at 672. See also Durham & Dushku, supra note 8, at 442
(opining that influential sectors of American society "suppress the voices of religious
traditionalism in subtle but powerful ways").
27. Gedicks, Hostility, supra note 8, at 674-75 (citations omitted). Professor Gedicks makes
essentially the same point in FREDERICK MARK GEDICKS, THE RrTORIC OF CHURCH AND STATE:
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF RELIGION CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE 29-30 (1995) [hereinafter GEDiCKS,
RHETORIC]. See also Durham & Dushku, supra note 8, at 443, who agree, claiming that our
nation's cultural leaders have also "progressively narrowed the range of permitted religious
contributions to public life by shifting the line between public and private spheres so as to enlarge
the former at the expense of the latter."
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Court may be considered highly significant only among we law profes-
sors who view the world through very narrow slits. Doubtless, the Court
has, at times, demanded that legislatures defend their enactments with a
secular purpose and effect,28 and it has attempted-with little success, at
least in some areas-to remove prayer from public schools.29 The New
Religionists, imbuing the Court with a far greater generative role in the
shaping of public views on religion than its confusing jurisprudence
deserves,30 have interpreted these decisions syllogistically:
"Secular" equals "non-religious";
"nonreligious" equals hostile;
Therefore, to require secular legislative purpose is to purge public
life of religious content.
Under this view, "privatization" is unequivocally pernicious. Pro-
fessor Carter encapsulates this position in the second chapter of his
widely-acclaimed work, The Culture of Disbelief. The chapter, titled
"God as Hobby," is devoted to and conveys the notion that "privatiza-
tion" has consigned religion to unimportance. Others claim that to
require one to "privatize" religious views is to reject them,3 1 thereby
likening privacy to unacceptability. For Professor Gedicks, privatizing
religion produces both of these results and more. To privatize, he
argues, is to dismiss religiously informed viewpoints as not only unim-
portant and unacceptable but as irrational as well. 2 Thus, all critics
28. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (holding, among other things, that a
statute violates the Establishment Clause unless it has a "secular legislative purpose... [and] its
principal or primary effect ... neither advances nor inhibit religion").
29. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 424 (1962). The Court reiterated its holding in a
slightly different context the next year. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 205
(1963); see also Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 42 (1980) (declaring unconstitutional a Kentucky
statute requiring the posting of a copy of the Ten Commandments in public school classrooms for
absence of a secular purpose). The Court also struck down Alabama's "moment of silence"
statute more recently on grounds of impermissible purpose. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 60-
61 (1985).
30. As one commentator notes: "Mocking the.., the Court's [Establishment Clause] results
has become a common (and easy) sport." Michael S. Paulsen, Lemon is Dead, 43 CASE W. RES.
L. REv. 795, 804 n.31 (1993).
31. See Larry Alexander, Liberalism, Religion, and the Unity of Epistemology, 30 SAN DIEoo
L. REv. 763, 788 & n.54 (1993); see David M. Smolin, Regulating Religious and Cultural
Conflict in a Postmodern America: A Response to Professor Perry, 76 IOWA L. REV. 1067, 1093
(1991) (arguing that "[a]ttempts to maintain the 'neutrality' of government ... intensify social
discord") (book review).
32. See supra text accompanying note 27. See also CARTER, supra note 8, at 6 (arguing that
there is a trend in "our political and legal cultures toward treating religious beliefs as arbitrary and
unimportant, a trend supported by a rhetoric that implies that there is something wrong with
religious devotion").
Carter carries this point to an indefensible conclusion. He discusses a book by two therapists,
Stephen Arterburn and Jack Felton, one of whom is an ordained minister. Id. at 8 (discussing
STEPHEN ARTERBURN & JACK FELTON, Toxic FAITH: UNDERSTANDING AND OVERCOMING
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conclude that to privatize religion in our liberal culture is to place reli-
gion outside the periphery of acceptable public discourse, especially as
that discourse turns to politically coercive proposals.
The New Religionist critique of religious privatization raises a
number of dark and unsettling issues. The first is that "privatization," as
defined by the critics, exists only in theory; not a shred of empirical
evidence supports the claim that religion has in fact been marginalized.
Although statistics do not make the case against the critics, (and it
should be acknowledged that public opinion polls do not require pro-
fessed believers to commit to living a religious life), it is nonetheless
worth mentioning that the American public does not seem to adhere to
the critics' beliefs. For example, the Gallup organization records that
over 94% of Americans declare their belief in God.33 Nearly 60% of
Americans state that religion occupies a "very important" position in
their lives. 34 Hardly a day goes by without some notice taken of a reli-
gious organization, often on the Christian Right, by the national and
local press." A quick glance at the news rack of any neighborhood
supermarket reveals copies of the Catholic catechism in paper back.
Clearly someone believes religion is flourishing in American culture.36
REUGIOUS ADDICTION (1991)). The two authors suggest that a person who would ignore the
needs of family to serve religion suffers "toxic faith," which reflects the belief, according to
Carter, that "no normal person, evidently, would sacrifice the things that most of us hold dear just
because of a belief that God so intended it." Id. Carter concludes: "One wonders how the authors
would have judged the toxicity of the Faith of Jesus, Moses, or Mohammed." Id.
Whatever one may think of the authors' views, surely Professor Carter has permitted his
argument to get the best of him. On the one hand, he simple begs the question of what is
"normal." But more crucially, Professor Carter cannot mean that Jesus, Moses, and Mohammed
were "normal," by whatever non-pejorative definition we choose. Isn't it precisely their non-
normality-even supernality-that makes them special or non-normal, although not (necessarily)
in the sense of psychopathological? Jesus was, according to Christian tradition, the Christ, son of
God. Is that "normal" by any definition?
33. See GEORGE GALLUP, JR. & JIM CASTELLI, THE PEOPLE'S RELIGION: AMERICAN FAITH IN
THE 90's 45 (1989). Other researchers found that approximately 92% of respondents described
themselves as having a religion. See BARRY A. KOSMIN & SEYMOUR P. LACHMAN, ONE NATION
UNDER GOD: RELIGION IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN SOCIETY 15-17 (1993).
34. See Kosmin & Lachman, supra note 33, at 9.
35. See, e.g., Sidney Blumenthal, Christian Soldiers, THE NEW YORKER, July 18, 1994, at 31.
John B. Judis, Crosses to Bear: The Many Faces of the Religious Right, THE NEW REPUBLIC,
Sept. 12, 1994, at 21. See also Anthony Grafton, The Sense of Ending, THE NEW REPUBLIC, March
8, 1993, at 29, 30 (noting the rise and acceptability of fundamentalist Christian views in the
United States, including the highest reaches of government) (book review). But cf. Phil Gailey,
Mainstreaming Godliness, N.Y. TIMEs BOOK REv., March, 5, 1995, at 11 (reviewing RALPH
REED'S POLITICALLY INCORRECT (1995)).
36. Professor Carter, recognizing this prevalence, argues that the fact that there is religious
rhetoric in public life does not mean that citizens to whom that rhetoric is precious are accorded
the respect they deserve. "In truth, the seeming ubiquity of religious language in our public
debates can itself be a form of trivialization," especially when politicians usurp religious language
to proffer "meaningless religious incantations." CARTER, supra note 8, at 45. Later in the book he
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A second disturbing point is the New Religionists' negative con-
ception of "privatization." In ordinary parlance the words "public" and
"private" do not connote disapproval. Especially in an era of pervasive
government regulation, the terms "public-ness" and "private-ness" are
indisputably social constructions; and so they make sense "only . . . by
reference to norms of behavior."37 Moreover, the terms are multi-
sensed, partaking as much of ideology as logic. 38 But when the terms
"private" and "public" are used in every day discourse they ordinarily
refer to one of three, non-exclusive ideas: (1) to questions of control
over "access"- to territory, to activities, to information about oneself,
or to resources; (2) to shorthand implications of "agency" relationships:
Is someone acting for or on one's own behalf (private), or for a commu-
nity (public)?; and (3) to indicators of "interest"-For whose gain or
loss is something said or done, for an individual's or small group's inter-
est or the public's? 39 None of these three common uses is inherently
negative or evil.
Most unsettling about the New Religionists' public/private critique
is its unstated (or perhaps unintended) theological implications. Any
one of the three ordinary uses of the public-private duality could account
for the supposed detrimental privatization the critics deplore. For exam-
ple, we no longer live in an Augustinian world in which the temporal/
eternal dualism prevails. ° One can consequently refer accurately to the
"privatization" of an individual's relationship with God as one reflected
in many Protestant denominations in which a corporate body is no
longer necessary for individual salvation.4' This same Augustinian
duality, projected ahead several centuries, accounts for the Medieval
convention of selling and purchasing indulgences, a long gone practice
that loses all coherence, if it ever had any, when sects are exclusively
declares that the very presence of clergypersons who have become prominent in public life "may
be a symptom of the problem, not evidence [of the] existence" of religion in public discourse. Id.
at 54.
37. Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the Common
Law Tort, 77 CAL. L. REv. 957, 969 (1989).
38. See Stanley I. Benn & Gerald F. Kraus, The Public and the Private: Concepts and
Actions in PUBLIC AND PRIVATE IN SOCIAL LIFE 3, 7-11, (S.I. Benn & G.F. Kraus eds., 1983).
39. See id. See also Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 477 (1968) (arguing that
"privacy" is more than an instrumental value, it is necessary for love, respect, friendship and trust
"without privacy [these relations] are simply inconceivable"). Gavison, supra note 15, at 6 adds
that private, as in "individual" or "small group," is self-regarding.
40. See generally KAREN ARMSTRONG, A HIsToRY OF GOD: THE 4000-YEAR QUEST OF
JUDAISM, CHRISTIANITY AND ISLAM 120-22 (1993) (discussing the eternal/temporal dualism of the
Augustinian world).
41. Within the Protestant churches of America, this particular dispute has its origins in the
settling of New England. See generally EDMUND S. MORGAN, THE PURITAN DILEMMA: THE
STORY OF JOHN WINTHROP (Oscar Handlin ed., 1958).
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concerned with individually achieved salvation.42 In our contemporary
context, to refer to religion today as a "private" matter could embrace all
three ordinary references. In a world where salvation purports to occur
with neither church nor congregation, we could lament (1) the denial of
"access" to those who would mediate between the individual and salva-
tion; (2) an understanding of "agency" as conduct undertaken in pursuit
of individual salvation; and (3) a pursuit of salvation that is undertaken
solely in one's own interest.
On this understanding of "privatizing" religion, a critic could pub-
licly grieve the Gnosticism of contemporary life, the loss of a necessary
and sufficient corporate entity-a Church, congregation or minion-that
either mediates between the individual and God, as in the Catholic
Church, or that informs and sustains that relationship, as with Judaism.
One could surely sympathize with a religiously-grounded, skeptical
position that reflects non-hostile doubt about individual epistemic claims
of knowledge of God, when that knowledge is entirely egoistic. The
very claim of personal, individual salvation-"My Boss Was a Jewish
Carpenter" or "I found It!" stuck on the bumper of a '93 Lumina-raises
a number of troubling questions which need not reflect any hostility to
religion generally: Has the believer truly communed with God, or only
with himself or herself? How do we know? How can any of us know
when the Supreme Being with whom communication is claimed pur-
ports to be known in the absence of a defining corporate entity or a
collectively drawn and understood, traditional identity? Put otherwise,
if Kierkegaard's individualistic conception of faith were taken as truth,
one might well ask the ontological question: "[W]hat prevents this pri-
vate commandment from being in truth a projection onto God of one's
own autonomous will?"
43
This conception of privatization plays no obvious or acknowledged
role in the New Religionists critique. For them, at least, the distress they
articulate over the "privatization" phenomenon refers to something other
than the problematic of egoistic versions of salvation. Their implicit
rejection of this concern makes an ironic statement about the relation-
ship between church and government: Religion must be of-and not
against-prevailing secular orthodoxy. There is more irony-if not out-
right contradiction-in the fact that the critics recognize the profound
practical effect religion has had in American political life, even as they
call for an end to religions' marginalization. For example, Professor
42. See NORMAN F. CANTOR, THE CIVILIZATION OF THE MIDDLE AGES 292-93, 504-05
(Harper Collins rev. ed. 1993).
43. NOVAK, supra note 3, at 90 ("Only a commandment perpetually binding on others as well
as on oneself in community-that is, one taken as law-transcends one's private isolation in time
and space.").
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McConnell implores not that religion receive public "aid, but only that it
not be driven to the margins of public life."" McConnell also acknowl-
edges, however, that "on many-maybe most-moral questions the
church is aligned with the culture," that is, that religious values often
influence public values.45 Is it simple coincidence that accounts for this
alignment? Professor Carter presents an equally difficult set of apparent
contradictions. He detects, on the one hand, trends within "our political
and legal culture toward treating religious beliefs as arbitrary and unim-
portant" and discerns that "[e]ven within acceptable mainline [religions],
we often seem most comfortable with people ... [who] treat religion as
a hobby: one does not talk about one's faith. 46 He notes unexceptiona-
bly, on the other hand, that religious rhetoric is already a staple in public
discussion,47 and that "society imposes moral judgments all the time...
[that are] informed by religious belief."48 Well, which is it-marginal-
ization or religiously-informed political judgments? Can it possibly be
both?
McConnell and Carter are not alone. Professor Michael Perry has
spent nearly a decade urging us to introduce more religious language in
public discourse as the antidote to a culture that has led religious indi-
viduals "to believe, or to half-believe, that they should keep their reli-
gion 'private,' that they should keep it not merely out of politics but out
of public too." 49 As one of Perry's reviewers notes, and as Professor
Perry well knows, "the claim that religious arguments are in reality
excluded from the public square is distinctly hyperbolic."50 Quoting a
prominent Jesuit theologian and sociologist, Perry approves the convic-
tion that "our tradition of religious ethics seems ...to enjoy a more
obvious public vigor and availability as a resource for renewal" than do
competing, secular theories.5 Is there a logic that permits a religious
44. Michael W. McConnell, The First Freedoms: Church and State in America to the
Passage of the First Amendment, 6 CON. COMM 115, 125 (1989) (reviewing THOMAS J. CURRY,
THE FIRST FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA TO THE PASSAGE OF THE FIRST
AMENDMENT (1986)).
45. Michael W. McConnell, Christ, Culture, and Courts: A Niebuhrian Examination of First
Amendment Jurisprudence, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 191, 207 (1992) (discussing Bowen v. Kendrick,
487 U.S. 589 (1988)).
46. CARTER, supra note 8, at 6, 29.
47. See id. at 101.
48. Id. at 256-57 (emphasis added). He notes earlier in the work that: "Despite repeated
proclamations that religion has lost its importance, most Americans insist that their religion is a
compelling force in making moral decisions." Id. at 20.
49. Perry, Speaking Theologically supra note 25, ch. 2 at 7.
50. Sanford Levinson, Religious Language and the Public Square, 105 HARv. L. REv. 2061,
2062 (1992) (reviewing MICHAEL J. PERRY, LOVE AND POWER: THE ROLE OF RELIGION AND
MORALYrrY N AMERICAN POLITICS (1991)).
51. Perry, Speaking Theologically, supra note 25, at ch. 2 at 24 (quoting JoHN A. COLEMAN,
AN AMEUCAN STRATEGIC THEOLOGY 192-95 (1982)).
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ethic to be concurrently "marginalized" and to "enjoy... obvious public
vigor and availability"?
The list of critics holding contradictory views of the relationship
between religion and politics does not end here, but little advantage is
gained by further stressing a point that is now clear: The call for more
religion and religious language in public discourse cannot-and, as the
New Religionists expressly recognize, does not-rest on an historical or
contemporaneous foundation lacking religious expression and relig-
iously-inspired political decision-making. As an empirical matter there
is indisputable evidence of both the prevalence and influence of reli-
gious organizations on public policy. As one researcher notes:
What is striking about the contemporary era .... is the extent to
which religious engagement, across the theological and ideological
spectrum, is institutionalized into national lobbying organizations. In
1950 there were only sixteen major religious lobbies in Washington
representing fairly narrow concerns. By 1985 there were at least
eighty and the list is growing.52
A 1994 publication of the Institute on Religion and Democracy identi-
fies "15 [Christian] Public Policy Pulpits" in Washington D.C. whose
task it is "to make their voices echo in Washington's corridors of polit-
ical power. '5 3 Another observer notes that ten percent of the nation's
radio stations are owned and operated by Christian agencies 4.5  The
Christian Coalition alone has become a fixture in Washington in the past
several years. Clearly, the notion that religion is missing from these
public squares is at least questionably overstated.
The undeniable prevalence and influence, however, is precisely
what many of the New Religionists deplore. As the next section illus-
trates, the call for more public religion-and the simultaneous condem-
nation of religious marginalization-reflect a desire to wrest both the
authority and the power to control the national socio-political agenda
from purveyors of the "wrong" kind of religion-the religion of the fun-
damentalist right. Note, too, that under the analysis offered here, the
"privatization" the New Religionists so fervently abhor turns on an
understanding of that term which is radically discordant with the norm.
They do not seek to regulate access to religious devotion generally, or to
define the agency for religious beliefs or practices, or to re-indicate on
52. Allen D. Hertzke, The Role of Religious Lobbies, in RELIGION IN AMERICAN POLITICS 123,
123 (Charles W. Dunn ed., 1989).
53. Roy HOWARD BECK, PROPHETS & POLITICS: HANDBOOK ON WASHINGTON OFFICE OF
U.S. CHURCHES i (1994) [hereinafter BECK, PROPHETS & POLITICS].
54. See Michael Weisskopf, Energized by Pulpit or Passion, the Public is Calling: 'Gospel
Grapevine' Displays Strength in Controversy Over Military Gay Ban, WASH. POST, Feb. 1, 1993,
at Al, A10.
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whose behalf spiritual activities are undertaken-in short, they are
unconcerned with the norms of traditional liberal theory. Rather, they
wish to relinquish or recast the normal attributes of privateness-their
own perceived "marginalization"-in favor of another form of public
religiosity that presumably holds out kinder and worthier attributes. The
claims of privatization are, in the end, unsupported; religion and reli-
gious rhetoric plainly resound through the "public square."
B. The "Public" in the "Public Square"
If, as an empirical matter, religion and religious voices are in fact
heard in public life, the first question must be: what is this "public
square" from which many very intelligent people believe religion is ban-
ished? The metaphor of the public square harkens back to Alexander
Meikeljohn's classic justification for and defense of free speech in the
setting of the traditional New England town meeting." Never far from
the surface of First Amendment discourse, the metaphor began to con-
trol the recent debate in 1984, with Richard J. Neuhaus's influential
book, The Naked Public Square. 6 Neuhaus locates the public square
not so much in the political arena, although he is clear that "government
impinges upon all public squares. 57 The public square he is most con-
cerned about resides within "the 'mediating structures' of our personal
and communal existence [including] family, neighborhood, church [and]
voluntary association. . . the people-sized, face-to-face institutions" of
our daily lives.5 8  In short, what in ordinary parlance we refer to as
"private" organizations, those over which we generally control access,
define interest and assume agency. As with other New Religionists,
though, Neuhaus also blames the Supreme Court for the nakedness of
civil rhetoric. Over time, he declares, the Court minimized its references
to the communal nature of religious values, arguing that the Court came
to use the term "religion" as a "radically individualized and privatized"
phenomenon: "Religion became a synonym for conscience."59 He adds
55. See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT
22-27 (1948).
56. NEUHAUS, supra note 8.
57. Id. at 28.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 80. Neuhaus' particular bete noire is Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970),
where the Court held that conscientious objector status must be granted when dictated by a
"registrant's moral, ethical, or religious beliefs about what is right and wrong ... [provided those]
beliefs be held with the strength of traditional religious convictions." Welsh, 398 U.S. at 340. Of
this language Neuhaus writes: "[R]eligion [after Welsh] is no longer a matter of content but of
sincerity. It is no longer a matter of communal values but of individual conviction. In short, it is
no longer a public reality and therefore cannot interfere with public business." NEUHAUS, supra
note 8, at 80.
The most polite response one could make to this claim is that it represents a substantial
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to privatization other dangers of "Naked-ness": American public culture
is simultaneously hostile to religion in its insistence on secular discourse
and conducive to captivity by the wrong kind of religion, namely, the
Christian far right.6°
Most of the contemporary critics of American public culture have
followed Neuhaus's language; and while not all have adopted his partic-
ular understanding of the metaphor, all lay a greater or lesser share of
the onus of secularization at the feet of the Supreme Court. Professor
Carter notes, for example, that the public square can be a "cold, suspi-
cious, and hostile place" from the viewpoint of "religiously devout peo-
ple whose consciences and visions of reality are influenced by faith. '61
More troubling still, especially for lawyers generally and legal academ-
ics and judges in particular, Carter identifies our "legal culture" as the
hostile "guards [of] the public square," a result which comes as "an awk-
ward [truth] ... for the guardians of the public square ... [where] tens
of millions of Americans rely on their religious traditions for the moral
knowledge that tells them how to conduct their lives, including their
political lives."'62  On this understanding, the "public square" looks
much like the courthouse square.
Under the critical eye of a group of scholars whose job requires
over-focusing on the judiciary, the Supreme Court and litigation that
challenges religious exemptions naturally come under fire as the greatest
menaces to religion in the public square:
Maybe [these challenges are] just another effort to ensure that inter-
mediate institutions, such as the religions, do not get in the way of the
government's will. Perhaps, in short, it is a way of ensuring that only
overstatement. To put the matter bluntly, Neuhaus' reaction is but one of many possible reactions
to this language. In the first place, the Court was responding to the exemption in a statute-this
was not a constitutional case-that required belief in a Supreme Being as a condition for
exemption. So the issue was whether or not one could conscientiously object to warfare if, but
only if, that individual were a recognized monotheist. The Court did not say that Congress had to
provide for conscientious objector status at all. See Welsh, 333 U.S. at 356 (Harlan, J.,
concurring). The Court did say that if Congress provides for this exemption, it cannot limit the
availability of the exemption to recognized monotheistic sects. See id. The Court certainly did
not say that individuals with such beliefs need have no religious affiliations. In fact, Welsh
became a Supreme Court case only because Welsh held very strong convictions. The conviction
must be held with respect to all wars; selective objection was ruled impermissible a year later.
See Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971). Thus it is not just sincerity, but sincerity plus
content; exactly as it had been before the Welsh opinion. The overwhelming number of successful
conscientious objector applicants have been affiliated with recognized, monotheistic religious
viewpoints; that affiliation reflects a substantial indicator of sincerity.
60. See NEUHAUS supra note 8, at 7 (stating that in the United States, the "constellation of
[Christian] engagement models.., is being moved dramatically by the emergence of the religious
new right").
61. CARTER, supra note 8, at 53.
62. Id. at 54, 67.
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one vision of the meaning of reality-that of the powerful group of
individuals called the state-is allowed a political role. Back in Toc-
queville's day, this was called tyranny. Nowadays, all too often, but
quite mistakenly, this is called the separation of church and state.63
Professor Perry returns to something closer to the Neuhaus defini-
tion, locating the public square primarily outside political chambers, in
what he and others refer to as the "cultural" sphere.' 4 Quoting David
Hollenbach, Perry argues that "the domains of government and policy-
formation are not generally the [most] appropriate ones . . . to argue
controverted theological and philosophical issues. 65 Rather, such
issues are better discussed "in those components of society that are the
primary bearers of cultural meaning and value-universities, religious
communities, the world of arts and serious journalism. ' 66 Hollenbach's
rejection of the political sphere as the locus of serious discussion about
the theological, epistemological, and religious bases of the good life
rests on three principal points: the widespread perception that the polit-
ical spheres are incapable of such an engagement; 67 the sense that legis-
lative and judicial decisions should reflect a preexisting cultural
consensus; and the fear that settling religious and philosophical differ-
ences in public "would border dangerously close to a form of political
absolutism, even totalitarianism.
68
Hollenbach's reasons for rejecting the political sphere, in part,
blink reality. First, as the current political scene amply demonstrates,
the political sphere is the ever-present, final battleground for precisely
the kind of debate he and Perry seek. Moreover, it borders on naive to
suppose that the judicial system reflects-or could reflect-only a pre-
existing cultural consensus. In fact, the conventional (and equally naive)
wisdom on the existence of judicial independence posits freedom from
that popular consensus. One might wonder when, if ever, the free
speech first amendment guarantees, for example, would be protected
were the judiciary's job to impose a preexisting public consensus.69
63. Id. at 123.
64. Perry, Speaking Theologically, supra note 25, at ch. 2 at 2-61, 83 n.166 (quoting David
Hollenbach, Contexts of the Political Role of Religion: Civil Society and Culture, 30 SAN DinGo
L. REv. 877, 900 (1993)).
65. Id. at ch. 2 at 23 (quoting Hollenbach).
66. Id. (quoting David Hollenbach, Civil Society: Beyond the Public-Private Dichotomy, 5
THE REsPONSIVE COMMUNTrrY 15, 22 (Winter 1994/95)).
67. David Hollenbach, Contexts of the Political Role of Religion: Civil Society and Culture,
30 SAN Dmo L. REv. 877, 890 (1993) (stating that "interest-group politics is frequently
incapable of even naming the social bonds that increasingly destine us to sharing either a common
good or a 'common bad') (citing EJ. DIONNE, JR., WHY AMEUCANS HATE POLITIcs (1991)).
68. Hollenbach, supra note 67, at 900.
69. One could make the Borkian claim that the pre-existing consensus is embodied in the first
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Finally, the danger of political absolutism is the precise danger the
prohibition against establishments is intended to address, and fully justi-
fies wariness of settling religious disputes in public.7" For that very rea-
son we are usually well served to follow Professor Cass Sunstein's
counsel, and maintain "a reluctance to attack one another's most basic or
defining commitments, at least if it is not necessary to do so in order to
decide particular controversies."" t Participants in public discourse gen-
erally fare well by following this advice. As he notes, "participants in
liberal political culture often seek agreement on what to do rather than
exactly how to think."72 Incompletely theorized agreements-majority
understandings on cultural and societal goals achieved without consen-
sus on the comprehensive theories of the good that move us toward these
goals-"promote a major goal of a heterogenous society: to make it
possible to obtain agreement where agreement is necessary, and to
make it unnecessary to obtain agreement where agreement is
impossible. "I'
In the end, Professor Perry also finds Caesar's misguided intellec-
tual purveyors in the nation's most prestigious academies. Chapter 1 of
Love and Power attacks liberal theorists for elevating so-called secular
"neutrality" above religious claims to truth, thereby privileging the sta-
tus quo and denying to him use of his most powerful arguments in pub-
lic ecumenical dialogue. 74 Thus, for Professor Perry the "public" in the
public square is primarily composed of the agencies of culture wherein
genuine, respectful dialogue can occur.
But he insists, as well, that legislative bodies occupy a portion of
the square. A compelling social function of Perry's ecumenical dis-
course is "the mediation of dissensus. 7 5 Even when the premises for
potential legislation are indeterminate, the continuing discussion of and
search for common religious, spiritual or secular grounds may conduce
to mediating ambiguity. Given cultural pluralism as a fact in most legis-
amendment itself. That conclusion, however, simply moves us one step further from the difficult
interpretive and normative questions involved in hard constitutional cases.
70. See Blumoff, Holocaust, supra note 8, at 615-17, 623-26.
71. Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARv. L. REv. 1733, 1735
(1995).
72. Id. at 1736 n.8 (discussing the distinctive feature of his largely descriptive account of
incompletely theorized agreements and the Rawlsian strategy). Elsewhere Sunstein notes that his
,argument... has a great deal to do with the problem of collective choice" generally. Id. at 1745.
73. Id. at 1743; see also Stephen Holmes, Gag Rules or the Politics of Omission, in
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY AND SOCIAL CHANGE 19, 19
(Jon Elster & Rune Slagstad eds., 1988) (stating that "[t]o avoid destructive conflicts, we suppress
controversial themes").
74. See PERRY, LOVE AND POWER, supra note 8 at 10, 14-15.
75. Id. at 95.
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lative assemblies, the ability of shared language76 to provide a common
bond permits legislation to go forward, to overcome parochial interests
and achieve "meanings that transcend whatever univocal determinations
we have achieved at any given moment. '77 In a word, he claims, dia-
logue "makes modem politics possible. 7 8
C. Privileging the Secular
This presumed loss of public religiosity has occurred, according to
virtually all the New Religionists, at a profoundly elevated level of
abstraction: to wit, an arrogant post-enlightenment epistemological
presumptuousness, or the tendency of our liberal democratic society to
privilege secular at the expense of religious discourse. This privileging,
they claim, is based on an erroneous view of religion as "irrational" or
"subjective"-"private"-when compared to secular language, which is
supposedly "rational" and "objective"-or "public. '
But the question the critics ask is misdirected. Our concern is not
76. Just what type of language Professor Perry seeks to bring into the dialogue is the source
of some ambiguity. I noted this in a prepublication review of LoVE AND POWER. See Theodore Y.
Blumoff, Disdain for the Lessons of History: Comments on Love and Power, 20 CAP. U. L. REv.
159, 171-72 n.59 (1991) (comments on Michael J. Perry, LOvE AND POWER: THE ROLE OF
MORALrrY AND RELIGION IN AMERICAN PUBLIC LIFE (1991)) [hereinafter Blumoff, History].
Similar confusion was confronted by Edward B. Foley, Tillich and Camus, Talking Politics, 92
COLUM. L. Rv. 954, 962 (1992) (reviewing MICHAEL. J. PERRY, LOVE AND POWER: THE ROLE OF
MORALITY AND RELIGION IN AMERICAN PUBLIC LIFE (1991)). The ambiguity is deepened because
Perry has repudiated his earlier moderately exclusivist view of dialogue for one that is entirely
inclusive. See generally Michael J. Perry, Religious Morality and Political Choice: Further
Thoughts-and Second Thoughts-on Love and Power, 30 SAN DIEGO L. Rv. 703 (1993)
(hereinafter Perry, Religious Morality].
77. PERRY, LOVE AND POWER, supra note 8, at 95 (quoting DONALD N. LEVINE, THE FLIGHT
FROM AMBIGUrrY 43 (1985)).
78. Id. Whether Perry is right in this assertion partakes more of an empirical matter than a
theoretical one; and as an empirical matter, one has cause to wonder whether any dialogue takes
place within our political institutions.
79. See Gedicks, Hostility, supra note 8, at 686. Even traditional liberals have bought into
this argument. Professor William Marshall, for example, a traditional liberal who fears the
expansion of advertently religious language in public discourse, nonetheless concurs in the current
fashion that finds unconvincing any epistemological distinction between secular and religious
knowledge:
First, [the distinction] is descriptively inaccurate. Just as not all non-religious
postulates and mores depend on reason, not all religious principles derive from faith.
Second, the epistemology of the reason versus religion dichotomy is not sound.
Reason may be subject to the same sort of epistemological attack as faith. The
belief that reason inspires moral or political truths is just that-a belief. The
acceptance of reason, in short, depends upon the acceptance of assertions as to the
epistemological superiority of reason that are ultimately unverifiable. Third, even if
faith can be epistemologically distinguished from reason, the conclusion that mores
produced by rational discourse are superior to those derived by faith seems arbitrary
at best. Dialogue and accessibility do not assure beneficial results.
Marshall, The Other Side, supra note 9, at 846-47 (concluding that special restraints on religion
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about the supremacy of non-religiously-based ideas or about reason
trumping religiously grounded knowledge. It is, at least in part, about
whether we can and must maintain a defensible-if unavoidably contin-
gent-boundary between the public and private, thereby insuring the
continuing health of a liberal democracy.
The epistemological issue is generally articulated by Professor
Larry Alexander, a commentator who is freely cited by his fellow New
Religionists.80 Alexander approaches the issue by asking whether we
come to our individual understanding of religious belief and secular-
liberal-knowledge in different ways. Alexander's largely barren
answer follows from asking an infertile question.
The argument begins by noting that any comprehensive normative
theory of the good must address the question of how it deals with those
whose competing theories reject the prevailing theory, that is, "how
[should] a theory . . . treat its own rejection[?]" 81 Liberalism tries to
minimize this issue by limiting the range of questions it addresses,
namely, by placing religious issues out of bounds. But liberalism can
invoke this jurisdictional limitation "only if ... its treatment of matters
within the realm of its concern are not just one sectarian position vying
with other versions of the Good."82 In turn, liberalism can make this
claim only if it "occup[ies] a different theoretical [epistemological] level
from that occupied by comprehensive religious views and views of the
morally good life and morally virtuous person." 3 Thus we come to the
fundamental question of whether liberalism-which includes within its
basic tenets a commitment to (more or less) religious tolerance-is true
as a normative theory, in the same way that a fundamentalist-and intol-
erant-theory (that of hypothetical religion X or religion Y) is true as a
religious belief. How does liberalism treat comprehensive normative
theories that reject its basic tenets and, specifically, its regime of
tolerance?
premised on its supposed epistemological inferiority to secular knowledge are ultimately insup-
portable) (citations omitted).
80. See Alexander, supra note 31, at 789-90; see, e.g., GEDICKS, RHETORIC, supra note 27, at
145 n.52; KENT GREENAWALT, PRIVATE CONSCIENCES AND PUBLIC REASONS 101 (1995); Scott C.
Idleman, Ideology as Interpretation: A Reply to Professor Greene's Theory of the Religion
Clauses, 1994 U. ILL. L. REv. 337, 348 n.44; Perry, Religious Morality, supra note 76, at 715
(citing Alexander as something of the final word on the epistemological equality of religious
knowledge with secular-liberal-knowledge); Scott E. Williams, Note, Religious Exemptions
and the Limits of Neutrality, 74 TEX. L. REv. 119, 139-40 n.87 (1995) (distinguishing among the
bases for reacting to nonobservational beliefs). Cf. William P. Marshall, Truth and the Religion
Clauses, 43 DEPAuL L. REv. 243, 266 (1994) (rejecting much of the New Religionist agenda but
agreeing with Alexander's analysis).
81. Alexander, supra note 31, at 763.
82. Id. at 764.
83. Id.
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Alexander creates a typical member of a hypothetical sect, one that
regards the saving of individual souls as an absolute, that is, as a relig-
iously-grounded, civic obligation, in the same way that liberalism
enforces an individual's "right" not to be saved. He contends that the
liberal comes to an understanding of liberal beliefs in much the same
way as the hypothetical believer comes to her religious beliefs. Both the
liberal and the sect member are schooled in their respective beliefs early
in their lives, both read and study as they mature, both find more knowl-
edgeable instructors whom they trust, and both ask, if only intuitively,
whether the scientific-"reason[ed]" beliefs-or the religious-"faith"-
based-beliefs they contemplate cohere with the rest of their belief sys-
tem."' The conclusion is that both come to reason and faith in the same
way, via the same learning and reasoning processes.
But this conclusion beggars discussion, because it is not at all clear
that its assumptions withstand rigorous analysis. In the first place, reli-
gious commitment is likely to precede cognition. 5 "If one learns Torah
in his youth," the Rabbis liked to say, "the words of Torah are absorbed
into his blood and issue clear from the mouth. If he learns Torah in his
old age, the words of Torah are not absorbed into his blood and do not
issue clear from his mouth. "86 The religious education of Hasidic Jew-
ish children starts with rituals at age two; the children begin to attend
day long classes in religious training at age three. "At first fulfilling his
ritual obligations by rote, the child learns to include almost all of his
activities in the realm of the sacrosanct. '8 7 I have no reason to believe
that the religious education of any seriously committed orthodox indi-
vidual of any other religion varies greatly.
But even if we concede the extraordinary commitment of orthodox
Hasidic Jews or orthodox Catholics or Amish or anything else, one
could still find telling a description of religious education that likens
spiritual learning to an organic process. It is a process that one takes
into one's body still pure, beginning with precognitive reverence for
authority and long hours of pure memorization-of ritual, of sacred
text-which antedates justification or warrant. Religion, Paul Tillich
wrote, "is at home everywhere, namely, in the depth of all functions of
man's spiritual life. Religion is the dimension of depth in all of them.
84. See id. at 768-70.
85. I am fortunate to have had the patient questioning and commitment of Robert Audi, who
has helped me appreciate some of the very difficult epistemological issues raised by these and
related questions.
86. ABRAHAM COHEN, EVERYMAN'S TALMUD 175 (1975) (emphasis added).
87. JEROME R. MiNTZ, LEGENDS OF THE LEGENDS OF THE HASIDIM: AN INTRODUCTION TO
HASIDIC CULTURE AND ORAL TRADITION IN THE NEw WORLD 64 (1968).
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Religion is the aspect of depth in the totality of the human spirit."88 It
is, in short, "a feeling" that accompanies and is one with the cognitive
function.8 9 It often precedes and remains in being with and shapes lib-
eral education.
Nor is it to just any authority that the child becomes committed:
the authority the child appeals to is transcendent, comforting and protec-
tive. It is a God softened by a white beard and friendly eyes set in
gently wrinkled sockets. This is the God whose presence and counte-
nance first carries the resting child through the night. Only with effort
and deliberate study does the God of the child's night reveal the majesty
and overwhelming mystery of the mature adult's God. Maimonides, the
Medieval Jewish philosopher best known for his work, The Guide for
the Perplexed, cautioned against this deeper contemplation before one
could "purify his character thoroughly and carefully...
But he must not, at the very outset of understanding, make a decisive
judgment, or give full rein to his ideas by attributing to his thoughts
the power to understand God. Instead, he must exercise hesitancy
and restraint and wait until the truths little by little disclose them-
selves to him. It is in the light of such behavior that we must under-
stand the verse: 'And Moses hid his face, for he was afraid to look
upon God.' (Exodus 3:6).90
To urge Maimonides' caution as one contemplates a liberal, non-reli-
gious, non-faith-based notion-to equate political liberalism and reli-
gious education-seems almost viscerally incoherent. Nothing remotely
similar in the realm of the profane requires this spiritual purification
before belief. It is religion's precognitive psychological role that gives
to Maimonides' statement its clarity and poignancy. We are, in short,
conditioned to religious faith long before "liberal" education and war-
ranted justification of faith or reason occurs.
Nor is there anything remotely similar between the domain of rea-
son and personal religious experience as a source of knowledge. In a
chapter titled "The Reality of the Unseen" in his classic, The Varieties of
Religious Experience, William James catalogues religious perception:
"There was not a mere consciousness of something there, but fused in
the central happiness of it, a startling awareness of some ineffable
good;" 91 "[I]t was not the consciousness of a live person, but of a spiri-
tual presence;' ' 92 "I remember the night, and almost the very spot on the
88. PAUL TILLICH, THEOLOGY OF CULTURE 7 (Robert C. Kimball ed., 1959).
89. See id.
90. ABRAHAM J. HESCHEL, MAIMONIDES: A BIOGRAPHY 157-58 (Joachim Neugroschel trans.,
1982).
91. WILLIAM JAMES, THE VARIETIES OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE 63 (1958).
92. Id. at 64.
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hilltop, where my soul opened out.., into the Infinite;" 93 "To this day
I cannot understand dallying with religion and the commands of
God. The very instant I heard my Father's cry calling unto me, my heart
bounded in recognition."'94 As James remarks, something is at work in
these experiences "more deep and more general than any of the special
and particular 'senses' by which the current psychology supposes exis-
tent realities normally to be originally revealed."9 The experiences, he
notes, are "something more like a sensation than an intellectual opera-
tion properly so-called. '96 We are here dealing not with reasoned under-
standing, but "the revelation of a reality other than that in which [the
actor] participates through ... ordinary daily life."97 This is the "feel-
ing" to which Dr. Tillich refers. To presume that we come to this other
reality as we come to an understanding of Marx's Economic and Philo-
sophical Manuscripts of 1844, for example, is just wrong.
But even were we to put religious experience aside and cede to
Professor Alexander his epistemological point, we would be required to
examine the unstated and unexamined premise on which it rests. He
writes:
If liberalism is true as a normative theory, then it follows that
any religious views that deny liberalism's tenets are false. If religion
X teaches that government should punish those who refuse to accept
the truth of religion X, then, if liberalism is true, that tenet of religion
X is false. If religion Y teaches that government should tax citizens
to support religion Y, then, if liberalism rejects government support
of religion, and is correct in doing so, religion Y's teaching is false.98
There are at least three ways to respond to the assumption that the
"truth" claims of liberalism and religion are measurable by the same
criteria. First, one can question any non-comparative methodological
approach to the notion of "jurisdictional limitations"; that is, one can ask
whether there is any value in identifying liberalism's self-preservation
urge without comparing that urge with similar urges in different ideolog-
ical frameworks. Second, one can examine closely the premise that
"truth," with respect to a partially comprehensive political theory, is the
same as "truth" with respect to a religious belief. Third, even if we
could deconstruct this idea of truth, we can question where that leaves
93. Id. at 67.
94. Id. at 69.
95. Id. at 61.
96. Id. at 66.
97. MIRCEA ELIADE, THE SACRED AND THE PROFANE: THE NATURE OF RELIGION 24 (Willard
R. Trask trans., Harcourt Brace & Co. 1987) (1957).
98. Alexander, supra note 31, at 766.
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the inquiry. In any event, we have reason to doubt the value of Alexan-
der's contention.
1. Non-Comparative Methodology-The first response to Alex-
ander's argument starts by recalling his assertion that liberalism's claim
to "partial" comprehensiveness-its ability to limit its jurisdictional
range to politics-is valid only to the extent that it is "not just one sec-
tarian position vying with others versions of the Good."99 On this view,
liberalism can evade the question of how it "treat[s] it own rejection"
only by comparing its epistemological approach with that of an intoler-
ant religion. 00 Fair enough, one could respond, but so what? That a
political theory-any political theory-will create and retain for itself
the means of its own survival-and may do so through familiar tropes of
one sort or another-is a universal constant. That liberalism rejects con-
duct' 0 1-and even speech' 02 -which would undermine one of its basic
tenets must be regarded as a given. Moreover, it is a constant with
respect to all political theories. Thus, to expect that a liberal political
regime would not embrace the power of self-defense is unreasonable.
Moreover, it is largely irrelevant.
0 3
It is irrelevant, although not without interest, if we concede that we
do not wish to live in a theocracy. What makes the issue intriguing is
not that liberalism would react to potential threats to its existence as
would any other hegemonic political philosophy, but that the particular
content of liberalism's ideology seems almost radically inclusive of
opposing ideologies. One would hardly blink an eye, for example, at
reports that a governing entity espousing Maoist or Leninist philoso-
phies (or a radical religious theory) would use ruthless terror to quell
perceived enemies of its state-supported ideology. Tiannamen Square
and the Iran Hostage Crisis remain vivid memories. Only because liber-
alism embraces the tenets of tolerance do we find any disconnected-
ness-so-called "non-neutrality"-when we come to analyze
liberalism's unavoidable aim of self-preservation. We should not, how-
ever, compare liberalism's tolerance for visions of the good with reli-
gions that reject tolerant regimes. We should, instead, compare
liberalism's "non-neutrality" with other political theories reflective of
the good. In fact, when we make the comparison Alexander asks for, we
ultimately confront incoherence.
This incoherence is implicit in Alexander's truth equivalence.
99. Alexander, supra note 31, at 764.
100. Id. at 763.
101. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §844(0(1994) (prohibiting the destruction of buildings in commerce).
102. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
103. I am addressing this issue in the final essay in this four part work, tentatively titled The
Tenacity of Liberal Ideal. (manuscript on file with author).
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Recall the initial proposition: "If liberalism is true as a normative the-
ory." That simple conditional expression asks us to assume that "truth,"
in reference to a political theory, and "truth," as a description of reli-
gious belief, are equivalent. The first point is that this equation lacks
relevance with respect to political ideologies that advertently reject reli-
gion or with respect to religiously intolerant political regimes. It can be
taken seriously in the context of liberalism only because the variety of
definitions of liberalism include some measure of tolerance for compet-
ing visions of the good.
2. Measuring Truth and Falsity-The question this premise
raises, therefore, is whether its implicit assumption of equivalence make
sense? Or is there an epistemological asymmetry that undermines the
coherence of the question itself, even as applied to liberalism, which is
perhaps the only political ideology to which one could even consider
applying it?
At the outset, we confront the dilemma of the term "truth": Does
the premise speak to a religion's theology? Psychology? Its source for
the deduction of principles of morality? A metaphysics, if it has one?
Its eschatology? These are not mere quibbles, but deep questions that
one cannot gloss over. On the one hand, liberalism can be said to enter-
tain an ethic of toleration, but does it have a theology? A peculiar psy-
chology? An eschatology? For example, when we ask if a religious
belief is "true" or "false," we might be making four disjunctive inquir-
ies into the nature of religious eschatological "authenticity": (1) whether
this is the one particular set of beliefs that leads to ultimate truth and
salvation; and, if not, (2) whether there is another particular religion that
reflects the set of beliefs that leads to this ultimate truth; (3) whether
there is more than one set of beliefs that leads to universal truth; or (4)
whether "ultimate truth" matters at all, that is, whether we cannot simply
live a genuinely righteous life within the tension of the unknown. On
this last version religion has a peculiar sociology, but its members may
care little about eschatology. But purely eschatological considerations
aside, Alexander's equation begs deeply problematic questions, appar-
ently assuming that religion X or Y, but not both, represents God's one
and only pathway to truth, as if this were the major question that religion
seeks to answer.
But these notions of "truth," be they eschatological or otherwise,
are meaningless in a non-religious context, (and perhaps not congenial
to any religious traditions10 4). If we ask "is liberalism 'true'?"-
104. Franz Rosenzweig, an influential early twentieth century German Jewish theologian,
wrote that Jews and Christians experienced what are, in effect, mutually dependent revelations
which, if lived out faithfully, were necessary for mutual redemption. See FRANZ ROSENZWEIG,
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whatever "true" means- we are not concerned with eschatology or a
life lived with religious fidelity. We could, in theory, be questioning
whether liberalism reflects the way God wants society ordered. Given
the history of liberalism as a partially comprehensive political theory,
however, we certainly need not ask this question at all. What our cur-
rent conditions require us to ask is a very different, essentially historical,
sociological and political question that has to do with the coexistence of,
and relative toleration for, competing visions of ultimate good and com-
peting teachings of Revelation.
Liberalism arose in a climate within which the answer to the ques-
tion about competing pathways to religious truths assumed, as Alexan-
der implicitly does, a particularist road to ultimate truth, all the while
murderously denying the virtue of toleration to anyone who denied the
"truth" of another's religion. Over time, liberalism ended (much of) the
murder. 10 5 To the extent that liberalism requires toleration, it permits
the question above-Is God's way to truth particular or universal?-to
be asked and answered. If any denomination claiming to represent the
only way to God is correct, liberalism generally permits that group to
reach the kingdom.° 6 In other words, liberalism is advertently agnostic
as to the very assumption Alexander makes. It does not deny the truth
of that denomination's or sect's beliefs. It permits-but does not
require-others to face eternal damnation or seek truth in their own way.
Liberalism, ironically, makes lesser claims to truth than do reli-
gions generally. That is, even if a particularist denomination correctly
THE STAR OF REDEMPTION (William W. Hallo trans., 1972). See also NOVAK, supra note 3, at 93-
113.
105. See JEFFREY STOUT, ETtuCS AFTER BABEL: THE LANGUAGE OF MORALS AND THEI
DISCONTENTS 212 (1988):
What made the creation of liberal institutions necessary, in large part, was the
manifest failure of religious groups of various sorts to establish rational agreement
on their competing detailed visions of the good. It was partly because people
recognized putting an end to religious warfare and intolerance as morally good-as
rationally preferable to continued attempts at imposing a more nearly complete
vision of the good by force-that liberal institutions have been able to get a foothold
here and there around the globe.
In other words, certain features of our society can be seen as justified by a self-
limiting consensus on the good-an agreement consisting partly in the realization
that it would be a bad thing, that it would make life worse for us all, to press too
hard or too far for agreement on all details in a given vision of the good.
106. Liberalism undoubtedly does put some restrictions on the way a sect or denomination
reaches salvation. For example, Jonestown tended to be rebuked on grounds of "informed
consent." See STANLEY HAUERWAS, On Taking Religion Seriously: The Challenge of Jonestown,
in AGAINST THE NATION: WAR AND SURVIVAL IN A LIBERAL SociETY 91 (Harper & Row 1985).
Similarly, the defense of Jim Bakker on charges of criminal fraud was rejected, despite the
repeated assertions of many of his followers that they had no regrets about how their money was
spent. See Frances Fitzgerald, Jim and Tammy, THE NEw YORKER, Apr. 23, 1990, at 45, 46-47.
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reflects eschatological truth, liberalism's eschatological innocence
forces upon a pluralistic society the second question: How would we
know? Eugene Borowitz, a liberal Jewish theologian, frames the issue
slightly differently: "Logically, one cannot deny that if there is but one
God in the universe then there can be but one truth. But we must now
ask, 'Who among us is intelligent enough to know that truth fully?"'
10 7
Framed differently, two fundamental questions remain unacknowledged:
Who will surrender his or her denomination's determination of what is
revealed and who makes this determination? Who indeed?
Liberalism undeniably exacts a cost: Religion X may not enlist
state aid to punish members of society who belong to religion non-X (or
to no religion at all) for failing to heed religion X's teachings and admo-
nitions. Religion X is denied the opportunity to act in a coercively intol-
erant way, to force conversion on other groups, even were it God's will
that religion X's evangelizers do so, or even to exact physical punish-
ment on its own.10 8 Liberalism, as a political ideology, does put limits
on religious conduct. In this sense liberalism does place its "non-neu-
tral" thumb on the side of the scales of all non-religion Xs', that is to
say, in favor of (or against) all religions. But even here, two more basic
questions arise, and as to the first we must borrow modestly from the
Utilitarians. If one stipulates that no one can know God's willfully, one
places limitations on all religion Xs' claims to eschatological, moral,
sociological or psychological truth. Liberalism simply accepts-and is
premised upon-that stipulation. 109 Thus, liberalism makes the search
for the variety of religious realities possible for a large group of people,
in fact, everyone. It, however, makes no claim of access to God's truth
or truths. It is, fundamentally and at bottom, procedural, consisting
itself of nothing or everything, depending upon one's point of view. It is
grounded in the historically warranted' 10 premise that civil society make
possible the search for ultimate reality by virtually all religious or spiri-
107. EUGENE B. BOROWrTZ, LIBERAL JUDAISM 4 (1984). Note that the logic of this question is
exceptionable in exactly the same way as is Alexander's. Why if there is but one God could not
that God make the truth accessible in many ways? Why should we suppose that God conceived
humans so narrowly? The difficult issue the universalist faces is maintaining that belief without
engaging in theological relativism. See supra note 104.
108. See, e.g., WILLIAM A. GALSTON, LIBERAL PURPOSES: GOODS, VIRTUES, AND DIvERSrrY
IN THE LIBERAL STATE 277 (1991) ("he moral commitments of liberalism influence-and in
some cases circumscribe-the ability of individuals within a liberal society to engage fully in
particular ways of life."); Richard Rorty, The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in PROSPECTS
FOR A COMMON MORALITY 255, 255 (Gene Outka & John P. Reeder, Jr. eds., 1993) (stating that
Jeffersonian Democracy drew the line on religious belief at "fanatical").
109. See, e.g., John Locke, A Plea for Religious Freedom, reprinted in THE ENLIGHTENMENT:
THE PROPER STUDY OF MANKIND 63 (Nicholas Capaldi ed., 1968) (1689); Mill, supra note 14, at
141-83; see also GALSTON, supra note 108, at 259-63 (summarizing Locke's position); id. at 277.
110. See generally Blumoff, History, supra note 76.
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tual individuals and groups."1 ' Hence the question-"Is liberalism true
in the way that religion X or Y is true?"-asks not simply the wrong
question, but one that links incommensurables. Religion X may believe
that liberalism fails to reflect or even impedes God's truth,1"2 by refus-
ing to foist it on others through state compulsion. The symmetry, how-
ever, is lacking, because liberalism takes no epistemic position as to
religion X's various claims of revealed truth, disabled by its premises
from either affirming or denying it.
113
One objection to this analysis suggests that I've loaded the dice."1 4
The notion of "stipulating" to an inability to know God's will might be
viewed as substituting one religious understanding of truth with another
liberal understanding of truth. To this objection at least two sufficient
responses exist. First, I know of no Western theism that claims to have
full access to God's will. To make such a claim would, from a Christian
perspective, deny the relevance of original sin"t5 and masquerade arro-
gance as theology. It would claim for mere mortals the omniscience that
Western religions of every sort universally accord to God alone. Sec-
ond, and more importantly in this context, such a criticism assumes epi-
111. Clearly there are some limits; sincerity of belief is not a license for pedophilia or fraud or
other perverse conduct, for example.
112. Of course, there are liberals notorious for their hostility towards those who, like many
fundamentalists, are unable to embrace the open-minded, ever-questioning stance that many
liberals embrace. See Mill, supra note 14, at 141-83 ("of the liberty of thought and discussion").
But liberalism must be honestly broad enough to embrace an individual's freedom to give himself
or herself over to a comprehensive religious vision of the good. See Michael Walzer, A Note on
Positive Freedom in Jewish Thought, 1 S'VARA 7, 7-8 (1990) (describing the rational choice to
limit one's own freedom); Theodore Y. Blumoff, Some Moral Implications of Finding No State
Action, 70 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 95, 112-13 (1994) (noting that such freedom is mandated by the
privacy inherent in the religion clauses).
113. There is a response to Professor Alexander's specific examples, in supra text
accompanying notes 80-85. First, liberalism does not deny that religion X's teachings about
punishing infidels may be true. It does insist that under the compromise worked out in the
Establishment Clause, civil society will not permit religion X to act upon those beliefs.
Liberalism's denial may be wrong, but its leaders have no way of knowing and do not, as liberals,
pretend to know if religion X's-or non-X's opposing-teachings are correct. Additionally, there
are many citizens who think religion X is wrong. Thus, in the absence of complete knowledge,
liberalism prefers to maintain peace. Religion Y's claim for support meets the same fate and is
premised on the same lack of epistemic symmetry. Religion Y's interpretation of God's will may
reflect ultimate truth; God may want Caesar to support religion Y's congregants with tax money.
But how do we know that? If we cannot know God's will, and that will is radically contestable
and contested, what course of conduct should we follow? If this position is proto-Utilitarian, so
be it.
114. This objection was voiced to me directly by Professor William Marshall, who is involved
in a similar project. See generally, William P. Marshall, In Defense of the Search for Truth as a
First Amendment Justification, 30 GA. L. REv. 1 (1995).
115. Here I am not thinking of this concept in its early, moralistic sense, but more as the notion
of "estrangement from oneself, from the other man, from the ground out of which we come and to
which we go." TiLLICH, supra note 88, at 210. Such estrangement a priori entails imperfect, if
not completely absent, understanding of God's will.
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stemic correspondence between the very strong truth claim to full
knowledge of a transcendent Being, and the weaker-and verifiable-
truth claim that men and women are imperfect beings, both as individu-
als and as groups of religious individuals. The equation of such truth
claims leads to an analogous ontological equation which fails to distin-
guish between the strong claim of internal realism-the existence of
Kantian "things-in-themselves"-and the lesser claims of external real-
ism that recognizes truth when the epistemological conditions sufficient
for the assumption of its presence permit people to agree, for example,
that I am sitting in a "real" chair as I type this sentence.' 1 6 The strong
claim is incoherent; the latter reflects common sense. While the strong
truth claims of religion are not incoherent, they are generally accessible
to a privileged few within each denomination, and are radically contesta-
ble. In contrast, every sentient being should recognize the truth of indi-
vidual fallibility, as easily as they recognize the chair I sit on. Thus, the
criticism that my analysis substitutes a secular-religious truth for a
purely religious one equates what is verifiable only to a privileged few
with what is universally verifiable.
3. Deconstructing "Truth"-If one were to rewrite the conditional
sentence of the Alexander equation, it might read:
If liberalism is an appropriate normative theory in a pluralistic
democracy, then it follows that any religious views that deny liber-
alism's tenet of toleration are inappropriate.
This sentence has the virtue of commensurability; it states that a religion
believing in universal, transcendent norms must reject the tolerance and
openness-the "robust, wide-open" conversation New York Times
1 17
demands. Two reactions immediately arise to this response.
First, the claim that religion requires intolerance is by no means
universally accepted. For example, Richard John Neuhaus, responding
to an essay by Stanley Fish, in which Fish argues that the truly religious
person wants to smash the liberal system, writes: "Christianity does pro-
pose a unified conception of life, but that unified conception of life com-
prehends and makes possible the pluralistic character of life as we
experience it."' 8 It thereby requires tolerance. Similarly, the Babylo-
116. See HILARY PuTNAM, THE MANY FACES OF REALISM: THE PAUL CARus LECTURES 3-21
(1987). Whether Putnam still hews to this distinction is, as he himself acknowledges, "unclear."
See Hilary Putnam, The Dewey Lectures 1994: Sense, Nonsense, and the Senses: An Inquiry into
the Powers of the Human Mind, 91 J. PnnLos. 445, 463 n.41 (1994). I deal with this in a recently
completed essay, "Liberalism's Stance Toward Religion in America-and Essay on the
Midsdirection of Diconstructionist Epistemology."
117. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). These thoughts were suggested in
part by Stanley Fish, Why We Can't All Just Get Along, FIRST THINGS, Feb. 1996, at 18.
118. Richard John Neuhaus, Why We Can Get Along, FIRST THINGS, Feb. 1996, at 27, 30. See
id. at 31 (noting that for Christians, "tolerance is not a compromise of truth but obedience to truth
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nian Talmud tells of a dispute between two schools of Hebrew learning,
both proclaiming that its interpretation of Halakha (the law) was correct.
According to legend, God proclaimed that both teachings were correct,
but that Hillel's school best reflected the law, because its teaching was
more "kindly and humble", and because Hillel's school taught the other
school's interpretation." 9 Tolerance of other views, as a self-corrective
ideal, created greater access to truth.
1 20
Second, the recast, commensurable statement of Alexander's epi-
stemic equation is unacceptable to most New Religionists. It has the
tendency to situate religion in a place where many of them would take
umbrage-namely, completely outside the mainstream. 2' A religion
committed to such transcendence could stand wholly apart from the cor-
ruption of liberalism. Robust debate is the last thing many genuine reli-
gions seek. Religion X's revelatory story is all there is; liberal open-
mindedness is heresy. Alternatively, and in recognition that the Enlight-
enment really is over, religion X could attempt to create a theocracy; or
it could make the best of a bad lot-liberal democracy-and make secu-
lar matters better or worse and thereby advance the Coming.
In contrast with the non-mainstream options awaiting religion X,
the New Religionists' writings assume a place in the mainstream. The
fundamental questions that concern them are not about epistemology, or
the ethics, sociology, metaphysics of religion, or the millennial condi-
tions most likely to catalyze the Coming of the Kingdom; they are about
power. Recall Professor Gedicks' division of public/private as mirroring
the division of rationality and passion:
The division of society into public and private spheres thus mirrors
the fundamental division in Western thought between subject and
object. In private life, subjectivity and passion hold sway. Individu-
als are free to do whatever they please for any reason (or for no rea-
son) as long as they do not harm anyone else....
Public life, on the other hand, is the realm of objectivity and
reason. In this realm, government and individuals must serve the col-
lective "public interest" rather than the idiosyncratic tastes and pref-
erences of any individual. Value choices must be rationally defended
in public life, for unlike private actions, public actions cannot be jus-
tified by mere appeal to an individual's tastes or preferences. 122
.... We do not kill one another over our disagreements about the will of God because it is the will
of God that we not kill one another over our disagreements about the will of God.").
119. Retold in JOSEPH TELUSHKIN, JEwIsH WISDOM: ETHICAL, SpRuIUAL, AND HISTORICAL
LESSONS FROM THE GREAT WORKS AND THINKERS 70-71 (1994).
120. Id. at 71.
121. See, e.g., Michael McConnell, Op. Ed. Letter, FIRST THINGS, June/July, 1996, at 2-3
(responding to a critique by Stanley Fish).
122. Gedicks, Hostility, supra note 8, at 674-75 (citations omitted); see also GEDICKS,
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This argument leads one to believe that liberalism itself creates the need
for a public/private division, and that the liberal tradition provides the
understanding of rationality upon which the division depends.1 23 But
that cannot be correct. The secular is only possible because there is a
religious realm. In fact, the public-private division is a contingent act of
power whose theological dimensions, as the current political climate
amply demonstrates, cannot be denied. Among the great socio-political
battles going on in American political culture today is an essentially
theological battle over rationality.
In sum, blaming the Enlightenment for America's current social
problems denies responsibility for our own dilemma. American society
will continue to permit abortion or not, continue to prohibit the teaching
of "creation science "or not, begin to raise the level of civility or not,
depending upon how these essentially theological battles are waged.
Professor Midge Decter marks the starting point for any meaningful
effort to restore, recreate or create ab initio a society committed to the
transcendent: "[L]et us just in all simplemindedness agree to recognize
that our deepest troubles are of our very own making. They do not stem
from enlightenment or from humanism; they are troubles of our very
own, very contemporary, self-generated atheism."
124
III. THE NEW JURISPRUDENTIAL REGIME OF SMITH/AMos
The refusal to take responsibility for our decisions and their unin-
tended consequences explains part of the New Religionists' reaction to
the most important case in the jurisprudence of our religion clauses in
recent years, Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v.
Smith.12 5 Reading the word "prohibit" in the First Amendment to
include only those acts that deliberately impair the exercise of religious
faith, Smith declared that generally applicable legislative (or executive)
acts having the effect-but not the intent-of making free exercise
impossible create no constitutionally impermissible burden. 126 This new
RHETORIC, supra, note 27, at 29-31. Durham & Dushku, supra note 8, at 443 agree, claiming that
our nation's cultural leaders have also "progressively narrowed the range of permitted religious
contributions to public life by shifting the line between public and private spheres so as to enlarge
the former [secular] at the expense of the latter."
123. Paul Tillich speaks to this issue implicitly in the context of his discussion of the
cosmological argument for the existence of the unconditioned: "[S]ecular culture is essentially as
impossible as atheism, because both presuppose the unconditional element and both express
ultimate concerns." TILLICH, supra note 88, at 27. The religious thus makes the secular possible
and knowable.
124. Midge Decter, A Jew in Anti-Christian America, FIRST THINGS, Oct. 1995, at 25, 29
(tracing the current cultural wars to our particular post-World War II ethos).
125. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
126. See id. at 878.
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understanding of religious freedom broke the long-standing Free Exer-
cise Clause tradition which held formally that only governmental inter-
ests of the highest order could trump our most sincerely-held religious
beliefs. 27 After Smith, unless the faithful receive a non-judicial exemp-
tion, they must abide by the dictates of generally applicable laws.
The New Religionists at least partially undermine their clarion call
for more religion in our public discourse by viewing Smith as yet
another case in which the Court privatizes and therefore trivializes reli-
gion. t28 Stephen Carter writes that "Native Americans, having once
been hounded from their lands, are now hounded from their religions,
with the complicity of a Supreme Court untroubled . . . when Native
Americans under a bona fide religious compulsion to use peyote in their
rituals are punished under state antidrug regulations."' 29 In his review
of Smith, Michael McConnell rightly excoriates the Court as profoundly
wrong. 30 Professor Steven Smith, noting that before Smith commenta-
tors had declared that prevailing doctrine was "useless in explaining or
predicting decisions," 13 1 nevertheless condemns the Court's opinion in
Smith. He argues that from pre- to post-Smith the Court's free exercise
"jurisprudence exhibits a shift from a discourse of tolerance to a dis-
course that goes under the benign heading of 'neutrality,' but in fact
amounts to a rhetoric of distortion, disrespect, 132 and ad hominem argu-
mentation."1 33 Frederick Mark Gedicks characterizes the Smith Court's
declared "fear of political chaos" as part and parcel of its liberal under-
standing that "religion is a taste or preference that people will affect in
order to take advantage of an exemption from general law." 134
127. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398
(1963). It is undeniable that one would not exhaust the fingers on one hand in tallying the
instances in which the Supreme Court sustained a Free Exercise challenge. That point, however,
understates the test's value as a prophylaxis. As Professor McConnell suggests, without the test in
place, legislative and executive bodies have no duty whatever to consider the effect of their work
on religious minorities. Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith
Decision, 57 U. Ci. L. REv. 1109, 1116-20 (1990) [hereinafter McConnell, Free Exercise].
128. See James D. Gordon III, Free Exercise on the Mountaintop, 79 CAL. L. REv. 91, 107
(1991); Steven D. Smith, The Rise and Fall of Religious Freedom in Constitutional Discourse,
140 U. PA. L. REv. 149, 231-37 (1991).
129. CARTER, supra note 8, at 9 (citation omitted). There is some irony here because while
critical of Smith, Carter understands that religions stand outside the Constitution and "should not
depend on [our] courts as the sole or even the most important protectors of religious autonomy."
Id. at 38.
130. See generally McConnell, Free Exercise, supra note 127.
131. Steven D. Smith, Free Exercise Doctrine and the Discourse of Disrespect, 65 U. COLO. L.
REv. 519, 520 (1994) [hereinafter Smith, Free Exercise Doctrine] (citing Mark V. Tushnet, Of
Church and State and the Supreme Court: Kurland Revisited, 1989 SUP. CT. REv. 373, 379;
Stephen Pepper, A Brief for the Free Exercise Clause, 7 J.L. & REL. 323, 345 (1989)).
132. I essentially agree with Professor Smith on this score.
133. Smith, Free Exercise Doctrine, supra note 131, at 521.
134. Gedicks, Hostility, supra note 8, at 689. Surely that conclusion is permissible, although
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But why such criticism? On any defensible reading of the Court's
opinion, Smith serves directly the goal of "public-izing" religion. As
explanation for their decision, the Court said the following: The free
exercise of religious belief does not require judicial oversight and the
guaranty of free exercise, always theretofore understood as the source of
protection for minorities, would find ample protection in legislative
assemblies. 13 5 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, issued an open
and unambiguous invitation to religious groups to lobby in America's
political forums and, given the richness of our beliefs and the depth of
our commitment to religion, there the faithful will find succor: "Values
that are protected against government interference . . . in the Bill of
Rights are not thereby banished from the political process.... [A] soci-
ety that believes in the negative protection accorded to religious belief
can be expected to be solicitous of that value in its legislation as
well."1
36
One is hard-pressed to imagine a more enthusiastic welcoming into
the public square. (I can think of no common sense definition of the
phrase "public square" that would exclude legislative bodies.) As long
as those legislatures do not engage in totally irrational acts, either by
targeting a specific religion for a special burden 137 or picking them out
for a special benefit based on nothing more than political clout,13 the
Court will steer clear of religious business. Thus it is in the most public
of all public forums, legislative assemblies, that religion will find maxi-
mum political protection and fulfillment. As if to prove the Smith
Court's point, not only did Oregon amend its statute to provide for the
sacramental use of peyote after Smith,139 but Congress went all the way
to the constitutional edge (and perhaps beyond 4 ') by passing legislation
mandating courts to use the compelling interest test before denying a
frankly I think the opinion is more reflective of a majoritarian maximizing frame of mind than fear
of chaos, although the two interpretations need not be inconsistent. On Justice Scalia's well-
documented penchant for minimizing individual liberties, see Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 979-1002 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring and dissenting) (opposing reproductive rights);
Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 572 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (upholding law
interpreted to prohibit non-obscene nude dancing because "as a general law regulating conduct
and not specifically directed at expression, it is not subject to First amendment scrutiny"); Michael
H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127-28 n.6 (1989) (plurality opinion) (rooting fundamental
protections at "the most specific level [of generalization] at which a relevant tradition protecting
... the asserted right can be identified").
135. See Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
136. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 872, 890 (1990).
137. See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
138. Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481 (1994).
139. ORE. Rv. STAT. § 475.992(5) (1993) (exempting from state prohibitions good faith use
of peyote in religious ritual).
140. The constitutionality of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act is debated in Symposium,
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 56 MONT. L. REv. 5 (1995).
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free exercise exemption from a generally applicable law."'
On this interpretation of Smith, an earlier decision, Corporation of
the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints
v. Amos, 142 assumes a central role in the new religion clause jurispru-
dence. Amos directed courts to uphold, against Establishment Clause
attack, legislative accommodations that are "rationally related to the
legitimate purpose of alleviating" a government burden on religious
exercise. 143 In light of Smith, Amos provides a necessary counterpoise.
An invitation to lobby has value just to the extent that legislative accom-
modations are permitted without great expense or argumentation.
Beyond this essential attribute of the new theological politics, at a
deeper level, Smith and Amos, give the ideal of "religious communitari-
anism" a major boost. 144 Thus, religious groups-be they lobbying
groups or otherwise-are recognized players in the public square. As
long as Amos remains good law, a result which must continue during the
Smith regime, it is hard to imagine how the ideal of religious association
and institutional religious fights can be compromised. On the view
offered here, Smith and Amos undermine the long standing lament that
the Court only occasionally recognizes religious group rights, and sub-
stantially co-opts the view that stresses insufficient protection for reli-
gious expression in the public square.
145
If the interpretation offered here is even approximately on target,
one needs to find an explanation for nearly universal condemnation of
Smith that emphasizes something other than marginalization. Certainly
one driving force is the fear that minorities, lacking the clout necessary
to move state legislatures, will suffer the unreviewability that follows
when an accommodation is denied. As Professor McConnell points out,
the absence of a constitutional mandate for accommodation, combined
with the demise of the compelling interest test, will alone change the
landscape of legislative debates.' 46 Put simply, non-mainstream reli-
gions are ignorable at a very small price. On the other hand, if it is a
141. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to -I (Supp. V 1994). See
Sullivan, supra note 24, at 1667 (noting that on an assimilationist view, Smith was decided
correctly because the Religious Freedom Restoration Act "paradoxically illustrates that the Smith
Court's premises were correct").
142. 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
143. Id. at 339.
144. Id. at 342 (Brennan, J., concurring) (emphasizing importance of religious community).
145. The Court recently reinforced this point in the Establishment Clause context as well. See
Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Virginia, 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995) (striking
down a prohibition on funding religious-evangelical-activities by a student organization at a
state university); Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 115 S. Ct. 2440 (1995)
(requiring the state to permit the Ohio Knights of the Ku Klux Klan to place a Latin cross on the
statehouse square).
146. See McConnell, Free Exercise, supra note 127, at 1132 (noting that the failure to obtain
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place at the table the New Religionists seek, Smith delivers a fully
upholstered chair, along with note pads and water pitchers. Religious
groups have a place which, according to the Christian Coalition's Direc-
tor Ralph Reed, they have no intention of abandoning.' 47 And there, of
course, is the proverbial rub!
IV. THE NEW RELIGIONISTS' THEOLOGICAL POLITICS
In the New Religionists' ideal polis, the public square, although
lacking uniform definition, is not the place for crass political horse-trad-
ing, nor is it the exclusive-or even proper-domain of the new Chris-
tian Right. In at least one sense, then, there is a resounding plausible
objection to everything I have said in this commentary to this point:
"You've missed the point! Sure, religiously-inspired groups can lobby
just like any other group. So what? For religion to play a role in recon-
stituting the sacredness embedded in American culture, religion must
participate as religion, and not as just one more interest group among
many."
This section examines the "So what?" issue. It begins with an
examination of the putative distinction between the undeniably sullying
demands of religious lobbying and something deemed more authentic-
"religion qua religion." It then attempts to place the New Religionist
movement in historical context, concluding that these latter day Social
Gospelers are at war with other Social Gospelers. For both the New
Religionists and their fundamentalist doppelgangers threaten to fulfill
the worst nightmares of the late nineteenth century revivalists: many
mistake the "Social Gospel" for the Gospel itself.
A. Church Apart from People
The New Religionists uniformly distinguish between religious par-
ticipation in normal politics and something they label "religion as reli-
gion." The case for this notion of "religion qua religion" was made
several years ago. These views are summarized in the following:
Any person or group who convincingly demonstrates an ability to
deliver large number of votes in an election will be listened to by
political representatives. Churches and other religious groups have
enjoyed considerable success ... through interest group politics....
an accommodation leaves the religion without recourse); see also 21 C.F.R. § 1307.31 (1989)
(permitting Native Americans to use peyote in religious rituals).
147. See, e.g., Carolyn Curtis, Putting Out a Contract: Christian Coalition's Vision [Etc.],
CHRISTIANITY TODAY, July 17, 1995, at 54; Steven V. Roberts, The Power and the Glory on
Capitol Hill, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., May 29, 1995, at 10 (stating that the conservative
Christian movement has "clearly earned a place at the political table").
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By contrast, religion enters political dialogue as a religion, and
not as an interest group, when it seek to provide a point of moral
reference to public policy debates. One thinks here of the anti-slav-
ery activism of northern Protestant abolitionists in the pre-Civil War
era, or the anti-abortion activism of the Roman Catholic Church in
contemporary politics. Religious groups do not enter these debates to
protect an economic interest; rather, they seek to witness against a
moral wrong by testifying to transcendent truth. 148
This distinction lacks both experiential and historical support. In
the first place, treating "interest group politics" and "economic interests"
as synonymous is too narrow. Many interest groups, including
churches, seek a political voice on non-economic issues. Moreover, this
understanding of the role of religion in our political culture is unnecessa-
rily thin. It is certainly not the case that all religious lobbying-or even
much of it-has anything to do with individual or corporate economic
gain. For example, in its handbook The Institute on Religion and
Democracy reports that a large majority of issues identified by each of
the fifteen groups as a "top priority" have little to do with economic
aggrandizement. 149 These are not trade association gun-slingers. The
Catholic Church and its lobby have actively solicited political support in
Washington for thirty years.150 And those issues that one might identify
as having an economic component-child nutrition and hunger, univer-
sal health care, hopelessness, strengthened emission controls, reauthoriz-
ing toxic waste cleanup-partake not of individual profits and losses,
but of income redistribution on behalf of the poorest among us.' 5 ' (By
the same token, even political lobbying is not limited to economic
issues. Certainly Mothers Against Drunk Driving and reproductive
rights advocates of every persuasion stripes do not petition government
for a larger, self-aggrandizing slice of the economic pie.)
Second, the examples used to demonstrate a different kind of public
religion are historically underexamined and at least partially misleading.
As a general matter, it is virtually impossible to identify any period-or
any issue in any period-in American history in which churches could
occupy only the moral high ground, without delving into the dirty work
of grass roots politics. For example, Professor Lee Benson, in his semi-
nal, prize winning work on Jacksonian Democracy, concludes that "it
148. Gedicks, Political Implications, supra note 13, at 421.
149. See, BECK, PROPHETS & POLITICS, supra note 53, at 155-68. One would be hard-pressed,
for example, to view today's uproar over, and lobbying about, so-called "partial birth abortions"
as somehow tainted or undignified, whatever one's position on this issue may be.
150. See, e.g., A. JAMES REICHLEY, RELIGION IN AMERICAN PUBLIC LIFE 291-94 (1985)
(describing the mobilization of the Catholic anti-abortion lobby after Roe v. Wade); BECK,
PROPHETS & PoLrrlcs, supra note 53, at 155-56.
151. See id.
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seems reasonably certain that few, if any, [political abolitionists] were
not intensely religious;" but that "[a]ll political abolitionists were not
religious ultraists."' 152 Put otherwise, the moral fervor that eventually
led to a civil war was, as a matter of social and cultural history, not
separately religious and political, as the examples above suggest, but
inextricably religious and political. Perhaps the most telling proof of
this proposition is the fact that the evangelical leaders who stepped to
the forefront of the abolitionist crusade were not only the "mainstay of
Republicanism," 153 but suffered from severe internal political strife that
frequently spilled into the public eye,' belying at least somewhat the
more spiritual and encyclical quality implied by the quote above. Poli-
tics and religion were merged, as they always are and forever will be.' 55
While the Catholic Church, for example, does issue periodic
encyclicals ex cathedra on such topics as the abortion issue, it also
maintains a lobbying office in Washington which in 1991 had a staff of
24 and a lobbying budget that reached nearly two and one-half million
dollars. 156 It is a mistake to assume that the two activities are unrelated.
In addition, there are at least thirty lobbying groups within and aligned
with the United States Catholic Conference.157 Among the reasons cited
for the rise of the Catholic lobby in the past twenty five years is the
"theology of Vatican II, which stresses increased lay participation within
the Church... [and] added impetus to persons outside of the hierarchi-
cal structure . . . to organize as Catholics concerned about particular
policy issues."' 58 In short, the distinction between religious lobbies and
religious voices in the public square is, perhaps unfortunately, more
wishful than descriptive. One separates the motives of the church from
those of its faithful congregants only at some risk. There is no church or
church position apart from the politically minded partisans who are its
constituents.
In Professor Michael Perry's 1991 text, Love and Power,1 59 he too
advocated a place for religion as religion-including some circum-
152. LEE BENSON, THE CONCEPT OF JACKSONIAN DEMOCRACY: NEW YORK AS A TEST CASE
212 (1961).
153. See TIMOTHY L. SMITH, REVIVALISM AND SOCIAL REFORM: AMERICAN PROTESTANTISM
ON THE EVE OF THE CIVIL WAR 202 (1957).
154. See id. at 178-203.
155. Whether this marriage of the profane and sacred is as it should be, either in early history
or contemporary social policy, is a matter I will take up at a later time.
156. See BECK, PROPHETS & POLITICS, supra note 53, at 41-43 (The total building budget was
$30,000,000 for approximately 300 occupants. Id. at 42.).
157. See Thomas J. O'Hara, The Catholic Lobby in Washington: Pluralism and Diversity
Among U.S. Catholics, in CHURCH POLITY AND AMERICAN POLITICS: ISSUES IN CONTEMPORARY
AMERICAN CATHOLICISM 143 (Mary C. Segers ed., 1990).
158. Id. at 155 (emphasis added).
159. PERRY, LOVE AND POWER, supra note 8.
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scribed use of religious language'60-in public policy discussions. He
also required of religions, as the cost of entering into "ecumenical polit-
ical dialogue," that their policy justifications for proposed courses of
political action, and especially coercive directives, be publicly "intelligi-
ble" and "accessible."'' 61 As defined, these terms prohibited the use of
any sect-specific justification to the extent "it relies on experiences or
premises that have little if any authority beyond the confines of one's
own moral or religious community."' 162 Perry's two conditions for par-
ticipation were necessary inferences from his understanding of religious
belief, which he described as one that comprehends "an unutterable spir-
itual reality" incapable of secularization.163  Unutterability, of course,
literally precludes interfaith conversation. He thus rejected any reliance
upon "epistemically privileged insight: religious revelation to, or infalli-
ble communication with, the will of God."'164
In one of his more recent efforts, Professor Perry reexamines the
notion of religion qua religion. In his forthcoming Religion in Politics:
Constitutional and Moral Perspectives, he opines that government
should not "base" its decision making on religious conceptions of moral-
ity: "[G]overnment should never make any ... political choice if but for
a religious argument it would not [make] the choice" at all.' 65 At the
same time, however, he finds no convincing reasons for preventing gov-
ernment officials from relying on religiously based arguments in making
a choice. 166 This articulation of the "religion as religion" leaves a basic
question unanswered: What is "religion qua religion"? One can agree
completely with Professor Perry's prescriptions without requiring any
special status for, or argument on behalf of, "religion as religion" in
public political discourse, 167 whatever that phrase may mean.
160. See PERRY, LovE AND POWER, supra note 8, at 88-91.
161. See PERRY, LoVE AND POWER supra note 8, at 105-06. It is only fair to note at the outset
that, regrettably, Professor Perry has altered this view in subsequent works. See infra text
accompanying notes 163-65.
162. Id. at 106. See generally Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., Politics Without Brackets on
Religious Convictions: Michael Perry and Bruce Ackerman on Neutrality, 64 TUL. L. REv. 1143
(1990) (concluding that introducing more religion into public life can be done with language
accessible to all). It is clear that Professor Perry has changed some of his views about
accessibility in later works. See supra note 160. It is not altogether clear, however, if he has
removed the ambiguity about religious language as language, or if he still abides by a limited use
of language in public discourse.
163. PERRY, LOVE AND POWER, supra note 8, at 73 (quoting ABRAHAM HESCHEL, MAN IS NOT
ALONE (1951) (publisher and cite omitted)).
164. PERRY, LOVE AND POWER, supra note 8, at 120.
165. Michael J. Perry, Religion in Politics: Constitutional and Moral Perspectives
(forthcoming) (manuscript on file with author).
166. See id. at ch. 2 at 6.
167. In his recent work, Professor Perry unfortunately took to heart some of the misdirected
criticism his requirements of intelligibility and accessibility suffered, and backed away from his
[Vol. 51:1
THE NEWEST SOCIAL GOSPEL
So the question remains: Can the church meaningfully speak qua
church, using languages and symbols that are inaccessible to the non-
adherent, in a secular society? I have concluded elsewhere that "[u]nless
we present our religiously-inspired motives in a common linguistic cur-
rency or demonstrate our good faith if failed effort to do so, at best we
run the risk of being ignored." 168 To speak in a "common linguistic
currency," however, is to take the parochial church out of itself and put
it into a secular setting where, if it pleases, it might attempt to influence
policy. The bottom line is that to address the religious outsider with
some hope of justifying or even explaining successfully religiously-
based political options, be it on issues related to reproductive rights,
poverty or sending American-led, NATO troops to Bosnia-Herzogovina,
demands precisely the kind of lobbying many New Religionists
deplore.1 69
Professor Carter also contends that religion and religious language
have vital roles to play in public discussion. He defends this point with
several arguments. His first point partakes of fairness. Carter writes
that it is simply impossible for some individuals and/or groups "to split
off vital components of their personalities" or "remake themselves
before they are allowed to press policy arguments" in the public
square. 170 Thus, he agrees with Michael Perry who maintains that a per-
views. Perry now concludes that his earlier work was too "exclusivist." He explains:
"Americans should not accept any exclusivist ideal, either of public political argument or of
political choice.... Instead, we should accept ... any controversial moral belief-including...
any supporting religious belief." Perry, Religious Morality, supra note 76, at 709. I would
suggest however, that some exclusivity is simply the price all religions pay when theological
incommensurability or faithful translation renders conversation either meaningless or useless.
For example, as a Jew I will not engage in dialogue with a conservative Protestant who lauds
her support for Israel, when that "support is based on an end-time theological scenario according
to which the return of the Jews to the Holy Land is a prelude to the Battle of Armageddon, the
Second Coming, and the subsequent conversion of Jews to Christ." Harvey Cox, The Warring
Visions of the Religious Right, ATLANTIC MoNTiHLY, Nov. 1995, at 59, 64. See GALSTON, supra
note 106, at 279. In this context, Professor Carter notes that "[ilt is hard to be happy if one's
religious choice is tolerated only in order to hasten its destruction." CARTER, supra note 8, at 94.
Thus, what Professor Perry fully recognized in his earlier work, that it is simply not "exclusivist"
to forgo dialogue when translation is neither possible nor wanted or both, he has now
unnecessarily forsaken.
168. Blumoff, Holocaust, supra note 8, at 615.
169. I am not endorsing religious lobbying as a normative matter. It is sullying and I suspect it
does not advance the cause of saving souls, if that happens to be the goal of some religions. I am
simply stating that it is unavoidable and that efforts to disentangle lobbying from religions' more
lofty goals are hopeless.
170. CATFra, supra note 8, at 230. At various points throughout the work, Carter reiterates his
understanding that the fervently religious individual whose politics and religion are hopelessly
intertwined is "sincere: she truly believed that she had identified God's command" when she
supported the struggle of the Central Americans who opposed right-wing regimes the US
supported. Id. at 69.
19961
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
son who would bracket her religious convictions annihilates "'herself
... [a]nd doing that would preclude her-the particular person she is-
from engaging in moral discourse with other members of society.'
' 171
In a related vein, Professor Carter notes that the way the critic of
public "God-Talk" ought to register displeasure with a religiously-
grounded message is to challenge the cause rather than the language in
which it is presented. Accordingly, he criticizes the criticizers, the
National Council of Churches, which had reacted negatively to the 1992
Republican National Convention's exclusivist religiosity. The Council
had labelled blasphemous efforts at the GOP gathering "to invoke the
infinite and holy God to assert the moral superiority of one people over
another, of one political party over another." 172 The Council opined that
"[a]ny partisan use of God's name tends to breed intolerance and to
divide."'' 73 In Carter's view
it was wrong [for the Council] to suggest that any partisan use of
God's name tends to [breed intolerance and to divide]. It is quite
enough for the council to criticize the positions espoused by those
who invoked God's name . . . without disputing the idea that one
party might in fact stand for values that are closer than the other's to
the will of God.
174
Carter's disapproval is both curious and troubling. First, it ignores
the fact that the Council's critique of the political use of God's name,
labelling it "blasphemous," might itself reflect an important, religiously-
inspired position.' 75 Therefore, his criticism easily turns upon itself. But
it is remains curious for an additional reason. The criticism is in tension
with a comment he made several pages earlier, where he quoted approv-
ingly from The New York Times columnist William Satire. Safire,
Carter noted, "hit the proverbial nail on its head" when he wrote
reproachfully that the GOP convention was invoking God's name "'as a
symbol for the other side's immorality, much as the American flag was
used in previous campaigns as a symbol for the other side's lack of
patriotism.""', 76 This approving statement mirrors Carter's unambiguous
condemnation of those politicians who usurp religious language and
171. Id. at 56 (quoting MICHAEL J. PERRY, MoRALITY, PoLITIcs AND LAW: A BICENTENNIAL
ESSAY 72-73) (1988)). Whether this assertion is empirically correct and applies to those who
wish to speak in public are not self-evident. Neither is it obvious that anyone accurately so
described is prevented from public discourse nor is it obvious exactly what they want to say that
requires another language.
172. Id. at 50.
173. Id
174. Id.
175. See supra note 118.
176. CARTER, supra note 8, at 47 (quoting William Safire, God Bless Us, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27,
1992, at A23).
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symbols; Carter argues that "the seeming ubiquity of religious language
in our public debates can itself be a form of trivialization." 177 Note the
contradiction: if it is impossible for many of the faithful "to split off
vital components of their personalities"17 8 or to "remake themselves
before they are allowed to press policy arguments" 179 in the public
square, then the approval of Safire and the denunciation of politicos who
commandeer religious symbols suggest that the Republican patriots who
impugned the patriotism of the non-believers were themselves outside
the description of "true believers."
That this conclusion would puzzle and trouble the Reverend Pat
Robertson seems undeniable, whatever one may think of his particular
brand of theo-politics. The conclusion is also at odds with Carter's
observation that "[f]or the religiously devout citizen, faith may be so
intertwined with personality that it is impossible to tell when one is act-
ing, or not acting, from religious motive-and this is certainly true for
legislators."180 At an even more fundamental level this criticism does
Carter in. As Stanley Fish notes, to condemn Patrick Buchanan's views
apart from their religious grounding accomplishes "exactly what [Carter]
inveighs against: he asks the religious persons to 'remake themselves
before they can legitimately be involved in secular political argu-
ment."' 18' The point is that one cannot separate the true-blue pro-lifer
from her message or the creationist from his beliefs because "this reli-
gious conviction is not incidental to his position; it is his position, and
determines its features in all their detail." 182
Elsewhere I have addressed other issues arising from the asserted
inability of the faithful to separate their religious and secular selves, con-
tending that the difficulty is often overstated and more theoretical than
real.18 3 It is sufficient for present purposes to note, first, that those who
press the argument are themselves capable of making the separation,
being among the loudest members of the God-talk conversation. The
bracketing dilemma, second, is self-limiting. Those who can speak truly
only in sacred language will have few to speak with and are not likely to
have a great effect on those who do not share their faith. As I noted
above, if one wishes some success in presenting religiously-inspired
argument, a widely-shared, secular language is indispensable.
But Professor Carter's confusion is in other respects equally troub-
177. Id. at 45.
178. Id. at 230.
179. Id. at 56.
180. Id. at 111.
181. Fish, supra note 117, at 24.
182. Id.
183. Blumoff, Holocaust, supra note 8, at 607-12.
19961.
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
ling. He concludes that a genuine concern ought to arise among the
faithful "when one's theology always ends up squaring precisely with
one's politics ... [because then] there is reason to suspect that far from
trying to discern God's will and follow it in the world, the political
preacher is first deciding what path to take in the world and then looking
for evidence that God agrees." 1" He makes this point while acknowl-
edging the power of-but wisely rejecting-the hermeneutic critique,
which he finds "far too nihilistic a theology."1 85 Political preachers, he
notes, understand that most Americans believe in an external reality
called God, but that such preachers are too self-effacing to admit, on the
one hand, that discovering the content of God's message is sometimes
very difficult and, on the other, that they are just making it up. 186 This
conclusion begets a troubling response: if Professors Perry and Carter
are correct, if one cannot discern-or at least cannot always discern-
whether one's motives are religious or secular, one cannot always deter-
mine when politics is driving religion or vice versa. The point seems to
be that using God's name in a partisan political fashion is acceptable and
immune from criticism, if but only if, the partisans who do so really
believe they are doing so genuinely and not simply usurping symbols.
But who are the honest partisans? Who determines the content of God's
will? Lastly, who makes these determinations and by what authority?
The conclusions Perry and Carter reach bespeak an unintended Tri-
umphalism wholly at odds with any inclusivist approach to religious dis-
course. This conclusion raises still another question: What is the view
of public theology that drives the New Religionists?
B. The Under-acknowledged Theology of the New Religionists
1. THE SOCIAL GOSPEL
"Since the turn of the century, one of the dominant themes in Chris-
tian social ethics has been the Christian's responsibility for societal
affairs." 187 For the most part-although a visitor from another land
would find it hard to believe today-that sense of responsibility was felt
most strongly by "liberal Christians." In fact, from the Civil War until
roughly the turn of the century fundamentalist evangelicals subscribed to
a theology that was compatible with the general notion of promoting the
184. CARTER, supra note 8, at 70.
185. Id. at 73. The critique would hold that "God is not discerned by the faithful but created
by them." Id.
186. See id.
187. Stanley Hauerwas, A Christian Critique of Christian America in RELIGION, MORALITY,
AND THE LAW: NoMos XXX 110, 113 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1988).
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public weal. "The Christian Church," Charles Finney, a leading "Revi-
valist of 1870" and President of Oberlin College, wrote
was designed to make aggressive movements in every direction-to
lift up her voice and put forth her energies against iniquity in high
and low places-to reform individuals, communities, and govern-
ment, and never rest until the kingdom .. .shall be given to the
people .. -until every form of iniquity shall be driven from the
earth.
188
Jonathan Blanchard, a leading abolitionist, agreed, describing the "per-
fect society" as one in which "the Law of God" and "the Law of the
Land" were one and the same.1
8 9
Sometime beginning around 1900, a vocal minority'90 of Protestant
clergymen came to view the United States as God's instrument for
bringing the Kingdom. Christianity's central aim was the coming of the
Kingdom of God, defined as both "the realm of love" and "the common-
wealth of labor." The Social Gospel's faithful pursuit of the Kingdom
was seminal, fully equal in church history, according to its most ardent
spokesman, Walter Rauschenbusch, to "the incarnation... [of] Athana-
sius, justification by faith alone [of] Martin Luther, and the sovereignty
of God [of] Jonathan Edwards."'' The Kingdom was reachable, more-
over, in the here and now due to their central belief in the primacy of
nurturance: "because 'the permanent vices and crimes of adults are not
transmitted by heredity, but by being socialized."' 9 z Overhauling the
environment would in time deliver the Kingdom. This theme was
echoed in the writing of Washington Gladden, the influential centrist
Pastor of the First Congregational Church of Columbus, Ohio. Gladden
emphasized "an immanent God, working through society as well as man
... with confidence [in] the steady improvement of both human nature
and social relations."'
193
Although the movement began as a reaction to the harsh, largely
urban conditions reflective of the prevailing laissez-faire infrastructure
of the Gospel of Wealth, Sidney Fine notes that the Social Gospelers
188. Charles Finney, Letters on Revival - No. 23, THE OBERLIN EVANGELIST, at 21 (no date)
quoted in GEORGE M. MARSDEN, FUNDAMENTALLISM AND AMERICAN CULTURE: THE SHAPING OF
TWENTIETH-CENTURY EVANGELICALISM: 1870-1925 86 (1980).
189. Quoted in id.
190. Marsden notes that these old line evangelicalists remained outward-looking, progressive
minded preachers seeking a unity with the state. Not until a liberal social gospel movement took
hold in the first decade after 1900 did the fundamentalists begin to react negatively and pull out of
secular society. See id. at 88-90.
191. REicHLEY, supra note 150, at 208 (quoting WALTER RAUSCHENBUSCH, A THEOLOGY FOR
THE SoCIAL GOSPEL (1917)) (page cite omitted).
192. Id.
193. PAUL F. BOLLER, JR., AMERICAN THOUGHT IN TRANSITION: THE IMPACT OF
EVOLUTIONARY NATURALISM, 1865-1900 120 (1969).
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began their crusade to regenerate society with an eye toward self-help,
not government assistance. Only when the enormity of the task revealed
itself did some come to realize that the "exhortation to follow the
Golden Rule was in itself an insufficient means of bringing about
needed changes and that state action might serve as an important ancil-
lary to Christian ethics in effecting the regeneration of society."' 94 Thus
Gladden and others of his ilk supported the progressive reform move-
ments of the day: the nascent union movement, maximum hour legisla-
tion, occupational safety regulation, and control of monopolies.
95
Nor was the crusade carried on by clerics alone. Influential lay
leaders like the economists Richard T. Ely and John R. Commons urged
the church to set the goals for the state and parishioners, to become
active in a new progressive Christian politics. 196 Wrote Ely, "God
works through the State in carrying out His purposes more universally
than through any other institution."'' 97 Commons concurred, urging fel-
low Christian Social Gospelers to occupy "the strategic position... [of]
government [which would serve] as the key to all social reforms and the
Christianization of society."'198 The founding membership of the Ameri-
can Economic Association, formed in 1885, included Ely and Gladden
and reflected the new synthesis of economics and religion. 9 9 All sub-
scribed in large measure to the dictum promulgated by Iowa (now Grin-
nell) College's Christian Socialist Professor of Applied Christianity,
George D. Herron: "The worst charge that can be made against a
Christian is that he attempts to justify the existing order. "200
Part of the appeal of the Social Gospel reflected an "authentic
reflection of some of the values of theist-humanism, in part on natural
sympathy for the socially downtrodden, and in part on the attraction of a
doctrine that seemed to return the church to the role of social umpire that
it had largely lost since disestablishment." 20' It was only when the
Social Gospelers' theology seemed no longer to distinguish the realms
of God and Caesar that most of the old line evangelicalists went their
separate way, for the theological stance of the old liners placed no obsta-
194. SIDNEY FINE, LAISSEZ FAiRE AND THE GENERAL-WELFARE STATE: A STUDY OF CONFLICT
IN AMERICAN THOUGHT, 1865-1901 180 (1964).
195. Id.
196. RICHARD HOFSTADTER, SOCIAL DARWINISM IN AMERICAN THOUGHT 107 (1955).
Hofstadter, describes Ely and Commons as two who along with "churchmen and other
professional economists" had become disenchanted with individualism.
197. FINE, supra note 194, at 180.
198. Id. at 181 (quoting JOHN R. COMMONS, SOCIAL REFORM AND THE CHURCH (1894)).
199. FINE, supra note 194, at 201.
200. Id. at 194 (quoting from GEORGE D. HERRON, THE NEW REDEMPTION: A CALL TO
RECONSTRUCT SOCIETY ACCORDING TO THE GOSPEL OF CHRIST 143 (1893)).
201. REiCHLEY, supra note 150, at 209.
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cles in the way of social action.2° 2 "It was absolutely essential to the
earlier evangelical support of public or private social programs that they
be understood as complementary outgrowths of the regenerating work of
Christ which saved souls for all eternity. 2 °3 Only when the liberal
Social Gospelers put themselves too fully into the public arena at the
expense of salvation through Christ, did their fundamentalist brethren
rebel.
The fundamentalists' rebellion began when the "truth" of "philo-
sophical pragmatism" was seen as replacing the truth of the gospel,
which could be known directly, and need not be tested by action. This
hostile position they ascribed to Walter Rauschenbusch. 2°  The Social
Gospelers' view that religious morality was important only as a determi-
nant of human conduct ("works") did battle with the notion of salvation
through trust in Christ ("faith"). By the early 1900s, the battle was no
longer one of balancing religious and social concerns. Professor Mars-
den writes: "Traditional Christian belief seemed to be at stake. The
Social Gospel was presented, or was thought to be presented, as
equivalent to the Gospel itself."205 From the fundamentalist perspective,
the genuine Gospel of Jesus had become disposable!
By the time of the New Deal, the Social Gospel had fallen into
disfavor with most liberal Protestants. Its legacy, however, weighed
immensely more than the actual numerical support it had enjoyed in its
heyday.
Through sermons, lectures, articles, books (like Charles M.
Sheldon's In His Steps, a best-selling novel about what Jesus would
do in the modem age, published in 1897), and various reform organi-
zations, Protestant clerical reformers, though a distinct minority in
the Gilded Age, were in time to have considerable influence on mid-
dle class America. Under their tutelage the Protestant church began
moving .. .toward the Social Gospel .. .[which would] become
strongly oriented toward progressive reform in the twentieth
century.206
Henry F. May, a leading social historian, broadened the same conclu-
sion: "The social gospel [movement] made it possible for Progressives
to 'justify social change in terms of Christian doctrine' and thus gave to
their cause 'authority, power and a link with tradition.' '20 7
202. MARSDEN, supra note 188, at 91.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 91-92.
205. Id. at 92.
206. BOLLER, supra note 193, at 122.
207. FINE, supra note 194, at 197 (quoting HENRY F. MAY, THE PROTESTANT CHURCHES AND
INDUSTRIAL AMERICA 224-31 (1949)).
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The tradition of political activism continued among liberal theolo-
gians. Although he eschewed the pie-in-the-sky liberalism of the early
Social Gospelers in favor of a "realistic liberalism" that sought interven-
tion but retained individual responsibility for failings,2"' Reinhold
Niebuhr carried on the tradition of liberal Christianity in the 1930s.
Describing as "vicious" Niebuhr's critique of the Social Gospelers' the-
ology and social optimism in the service of democracy, Professor
Hauerwas nonetheless notes that Niebuhr "never questioned the assump-
tion that democracy was the most appropriate form of society . .. for
Christians.... In effect, from Rauschenbusch to the present, Christian
social ethics has had one agenda-to show why American democracy
possesses distinctive religious status. The primary subject of Christian
ethics in America has been America."209
2. (MOSTLY) LIBERAL AND THEORETICAL POLITICS
"Behind the barbed wire, in the shadow of the gas chambers, all
answers sound like mockery. ' 210 Thus chastened by the unspeakable
horrors of the twentieth century, the New Religionists can no longer
preach with the enthusiasm of Rauschenbusch or the certainty underly-
ing Gladden's social salvation.21' Yet the model to which most of these
New Social Gospelers subscribe assumes without question a political
leadership role for heretofore liberal Christianity. Country and church,
church and country-neither Caesar nor God, politics nor theology, can
survive without the other; and none can survive with the wrong [neces-
sarily "Right"] theo-political agenda.
John Neuhaus has described the broad outlines of the theo-political
model for the liberal and conservative New Religionists' Newest Social
Gospel:
There is a venerable Christian tradition of choosing the "sectarian"
rather than the "churchly" model of discipleship. The churchly
model is inclusive, catholic, eager to influence the social order. The
sectarian model defines itself against that order. It speaks truth to
power from outside the circle of power, and is frankly skeptical about
influencing that power for good. In the sectarian view, there can be
no legitimate commerce between Christ and Caesar. Sectarianism for
the sake of the integrity of the gospel has at times been an honorable
208. RFiCHLEY, supra note 150, at 227.
209. HAUERWAS, supra note 187, at 117.
210. DAVID J. WOLPE, THE HEALER OF SHATTERED HEARTS: A JEWISH VIEw OF GOD 155
(1990).
211. Neuhaus, writing with the same breath in which he mentions "Hitler, Stalin, and Mao,"
concludes the lesson with the following: "When [public) religious transcendence is excluded....
the space is opened to seven demons aspiring to transcendent authority," NEUHAUS, supra note 8,
at 8-9. See also CARTER, supra note 8, at 89, 94.
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and indeed necessary choice.21 2
But the leadership of the mainline churches, Neuhaus concludes, is not
sectarian.213 It must be involved with the aims of mammon. "The main
line of the mainline story," Neuhaus writes, "was confidence and hope
regarding the Americanizing of Christianity and the Christianizing of
America.
214
Professor Carter never addresses directly the propriety of the
churchly paradigm he embraces, but his theo-politics shine through
clearly in his discussion of the Supreme Court's religion clause jurispru-
dence-and it is "mainline." As we shall soon discover, however, it is
unclear whether his view of public religion conforms with his articula-
tion of the nature of religion.
The more that the [Establishment] Clause is used to disable reli-
gious groups from active involvement in the programs of the welfare
state, or, for that matter, from active involvement in the public square
that is the crucible of public policy, the less the religions will be able
to play their proper democratic role of mediating between the individ-
ual and the state and the less they will be able to play their proper
theological role of protecting the people of God.215
The first point is that the role of religion is publicly participatory.
Without active participation in politics, Carter believes, religion is
unable to mediate between state and individual. This conclusion begs
the normative question of the essential role of the church in culture. Is it
so obviously the case that religions can protect the children of God only
by immersion in Caesar's realm? Surely the assertion requires some
proof, because its status as truth is not self-evident. The theologian
Stanley Hauerwas has enjoyed a rich and influential career by pressing
with great conviction for what Neuhaus dismisses as the "sectarian"
model.2" 6 Carter's own understanding of religion also betrays tension in
his thought. Under the view of religion as "mediator," the church could
logically stand as a bulwark against the state; it could create and fortify
the individuals' values sans secular politics. It is enough to understand
212. NEUHAUS, supra note 8, at 57. Others have labelled this essentialism polarity
"Calvinistic" and "pietistic," the latter mostly existing "in essential tension with the culture."
MARSDEN, supra note 188, at 252 n.4.
213. NEUAUtS, supra note 8, at 57.
214. Id. at 219.
215. CARTER, supra note 8, at 123. Much of the remainder of the book is dedicated to the
argument in favor of greater accommodation of religion, that is, legislative exemptions from
generally applicable law for religious people.
216. See, e.g., HAUERWAS, supra note 187, at 110; STANLEY HAUERWAS, A COMMUNITY OF
CHARACTER: TOWARD A CONSTRUCTIVE CHRISTIAN SocIAL Emc (1981); Stanley Hauerwas &
Michael Baxter, The Kingship of Christ: Why Freedom of "Belief' Is Not Enough, 42 DEPAUL L.
REv. 107 (1992) [hereinafter Hauerwas and Baxter].
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that if we are all created in God's image, we have laid the foundation for
an all-encompassing moral structure that does not require the participa-
tion of "religion qua religion" in the political scheme.
21 7
In fact, Professor Carter argues convincingly that religion's source
of power in our everyday lives is primarily epistemological: It provides
the faithful with the ability to "see many things differently from the way
their fellow citizens do."218 And he contends that "religions can make a
difference ...only if they remain independent from the world. 219
Although acknowledging that no religion "always" conflicts with the
goals of the state, still he concludes that religions should provide "alter-
native meanings of the world ... that are in competition with those
imposed by the state."22 They should move away from the center of
secular power-but not influence-to retain their role of "external moral
critic."22' In other words, Carter's understanding of religion, and it is
one with which I agree, seems to demand that religion be "privatized,"
as that term is customarily used. Thus, the stance of religion is opposi-
tional; it must contest the way of the world, as perceived by the secular
state. Accordingly, religion must not only occupy a position outside the
secular; it must also protect its sacred churches, synagogues and
mosques from public-state-access: our sacred places and sacral
thoughts are private; we pray for ourselves and on our own behalf. We
must stand apart from the state and concomitantly exclude it because the
church cannot logically or practically stand apart from the state and per-
form its mediating function if the state has access to and control over the
sacred. On this understanding it is at best unclear why we should bring
our religion qua religion into the public political conversation. For noth-
ing in the public realm is free.222
Professor Michael Perry's work, subscribing substantially to the
work of Catholic theologian John Courtney Murray, places him squarely
within Professor Neuhaus' "mainline" as well. Perry's 1991 book, Love
and Power, is an heroic if failed effort to justify "ecumenical political
217. See generally, COHEN, supra note 86, at 210-16.
218. CARTER, supra note 8, at 37.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 272-73.
221. Id. at 273.
222. See, e.g., Hauerwas & Baxter, supra note 216, at 120 (arguing that as American
Catholicism sought accommodation in America society it "lost (or is losing) its strong sense of the
inherently social character of Christianity"); Sullivan, supra note 24, at 1667-68 (arguing religious
participation in politics "would diminish religion's capacity to serve as an autonomous source of
values"); Mark V. Tushnet, Desegregating "Church" and "Culture," 42 DEPAUL L. REv. 235,
241 (1992) ("When [political] culture grants such accommodations [to churches], it lowers the
price we have to pay for our beliefs.").
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dialogue." Borrowing from the proto-liberal Williamsburg Charter,
Perry writes the following:
The aim of ecumenical politics is. . . "neither a naked public square
where all religion is excluded, nor a sacred public square with any
religion established or semi-established." The aim, rather, "is a civil
public square in which citizens of all religious faiths, or none, engage
one another in continuing democratic discourse. 223
As noted earlier,2  although Professor Perry would prefer that the dia-
logue occur in our institutions of culture rather than politics, he does
not-and cannot-rule political halls out of bounds. His aim, therefore,
is to "lay down," in Murray's words, "some set of principles [that] must
motivate the participation of all religious groups, despite their dissen-
sions, in the oneness of the community."2 25
The ideals the New Religionists proselytize can no more escape the
gravitational norms that bend their vision than can anyone else. Those
norms, it turns out, are mostly, but not exclusively, liberal and Demo-
cratic (small "1," big "D"). Professor Perry reveals his bias on the dedi-
cation page of Love and Power. The work honors the memory of "the
six Jesuit Priests, their cook and her daughter, ' 226 all liberal clerics
killed in the cause of revolution in El Salvador on November 16, 1989.
Although his more recent work has broadened the tent over the public
square to include many participants who no doubt subscribe to conserva-
tive, even fundamentalist, political agendas, he has done so notwith-
standing his knowledge that with some of these faithful, dialogue may
be impossible.227 His theology, which embraces "fallibilism" and "plu-
ralism,' 228 is anathema to fundamentalists of all stripes, the former being
a tool of the devil himself.229 Even for liberal Christian theologians,
"pluralism may be a fact of history, but it is against the will of God."23
Carter too subscribes to a political agenda that is unmistakably lib-
223. PERRY, LOVE AND POWER supra note 8, at 45 (quoting THE WILLIAMSBURG CHARTER: A
NATIONAL CELEBRATION AND REAFFIRMATION OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT RELIGIOUS LIBERTY
CLAUSES 19 (1988)).
224. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
225. PERRY, LOVE AND POWER supra note 8, at 5 (quoting John Courtney Murray, WE HOLD
THESE TRUTHS: CATHOLIC REFLECTIONS ON THE AMERICAN PROPOSITION X (1960); see also
NEUHAUS, supra note 8, at 144-45 (quoting a rabbi friend who told him "When I hear the term
'Christian America,' I see barbed wire.").
226. PERRY, LOVE AND POWER, supra note 8, at dedication page.
227. See notes 165-67 and accompanying text.
228. PERRY, LOVE AND POWER supra note 8, at 100-01.
229. See Marsden, supra note 188, at 106 (describing an "intensely anti-rationalistic" strain of
fundamentalists who equated any criticism of Scripture as the work of the Devil).
230. CARTER, supra note 8, at 293 n.9 (quoting Jesuit theologian John Courtney Murray who is
quoted in Betty Mensch & Alan Freeman, Losing Faith in Public Schools, 7 TIKKUN 31, 36
(1992)).
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eral, notwithstanding some misunderstanding that followed in the wake
of his earlier work.231 Thus he rebukes (mostly conservative fundamen-
talist) religious preachers for "trivializing" religion in public.2 32  He
argues in a similar vein that the fact that a number of mostly conserva-
tive fundamentalist clergy have become politically prominent "may be a
symptom of the problem, not evidence of ... [the] existence" of reli-
gious freedom in public discourse.233 On a personal level Carter finds
the New Religious Right mostly insufferable, 34 supports the ordination
of women within his own church,235 describes himself as "moderately
pro-choice, 236 and (accurately) describes those who desire equal time
for "creation science" as pursuing bad science.237
3. COMING FULL CIRCLE: THE NEW "KINGDOM OF POLITICS"
By the end of the last century, the battle between old line evangeli-
calists and the new Social Gospel seemed to put "[t]raditional Christian
belief[s] ... at stake. 238 The concern that turned the old line fundamen-
talists away from social causes was their sense that "[t]he Social Gospel
was presented ... as equivalent to the Gospel itself."239 Near the end of
our own century and the coming millennium, both sides in the culture
wars, the New Religionist and the New Religious Right, preach a social
gospel that comes very close to the equivalent of the Gospel itself; both
pursue social causes in the name of a religion that seeks all the power
Caesar has to offer. Yet whereas the largely left-leaning New Religion-
ists mostly critique the Supreme Court and proffer theologically under-
nourished theories for ideal discourse, the true blue right-leaning New
Social Gospelers are willing to smudge themselves at the political feed-
ing troughs, seeking to make changes the old fashioned way, one repre-
sentative, one vote at a time.
The Christian right recognizes otherwise contingent public/private
boundaries only when they believe that the God with whom they com-
231. When Confessions of an Affirmative Action Baby, Carter's first major popular work
appeared, many early commentators mistook Carter's honesty about the costs of affirmative action
for a conservative political agenda. See, e.g., David Walsh, Choosing Up Sides in the Debate over
Property Versus Race, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 26, 1992, at 81.
232. CARTER, supra note 8, at 44.
233. Id. at 54, 80. See Sullivan, supra note 24, at 1655-56 (characterizing Carter's description
of right-wing religious language and the politicians' use of it as "dysfunctional God talk").
234. Carter's inhospitableness towards fundamentalist religions aligned with the political right
is clear. See Stephen Carter, Let us Pray, TiE NEw YORKER, Dec. 5, 1994, at 60.
235. CARTER, supra note 8, at 39-40.
236. Id. at 234.
237. Id. at 175-76.
238. See supra notes 202-03 and accompanying text.
239. MARSDEN, supra note 188 at 92.
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mune sets them. They have, in fact, donned the political mantle-if not
the causes-of the old Social Gospelers.
Computers, direct mail, phone banks, faxes: Through these tech-
niques and others of state-of-the-art politics, the Christian Coalition
has built its list of donors and subscribers and rally-attendees from
57,000 in 1990 to a projected 1.5 million by the end of the year.
Reed's [Ralph Reed, executive director] budget has more than
doubled since 1992, to $20 million this year, and in the past 12
months, he said, his groups has dispersed 40 million pieces of
mail.
240
Subscribing to a postmillennial eschatology, the Christian Coalition
beats the doors of any member of congress who might advance the Sec-
ond Coming by improving the conditions in the here and now.24 They
too have, ironically, adopted the call of Professor George D. Herron,
Grinnell College's Christian Socialist Professor of Applied Christianity:
"The worst charge that can be made against a Christian is that he
attempts to justify the existing order."242
In today's world of fundamentalist theo-politics, no public issue
escapes the margins of religious counsel. One observer records that
when the leaders of the Republican party sought to
water down a big tax break for families with children ... it was the
Christian Coalition that turned up the heat .... A day later the plan
vanished.
Born of evangelical fervor on issues such as school prayer and
abortion, the Christian Coalition has set off on a broader, more ambi-
tious path: It now seeks to influence the national agenda on key
budget items, including basic provisions of tax policy that affect mil-
lions of households.243
Notes another commentator of the Coalition's goals: "They intend to
throw the Democrats out of the White House, to expand the Republican
majority in Congress and to see passage of the ambitious Contract With
the American Family legislation."' 2
Nor are presidential politics out of bounds. To the contrary, the
1996 presidential election was seen as a crusade. Reed, while address-
ing a crowd of the faithful at the Fall, 1995 Coalition convention, made
clear his organization's agenda: "Who [i.e., which Republican candi-
240. David Von Drehle & Thomas B. Edsall, Life of the Grand Old Party: Energized
Coalition Enters Another Political Phase, THE WASHINGTON POST, Aug. 14, 1994, at Al.
241. See Cox, supra note 167, at 66.
242. See FINE, supra note 194, at 194 (quoting HERRON, supra note 197).
243. Jonathan Peterson, Christian Group Adds Budget Items to Agenda, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 30,
1995, at Al.
244. Sara Diamond, God Stuffs the Ballot Box: Christian Coalition "Road to Victory"
Convention, TmE NATION, Oct. 9, 1995, at 386.
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date] will stand for safer neighborhoods, schools that work, strong fami-
lies, protection of innocent human life, religious liberty . . . and
[withstand] the threat from within?"24 5 To the denial that the Coalition
seeks to be a "wholly owned subsidiary of the Republican Party," one
Coalition critic, the Reverend Barry Lynn, quipped, "[n]o, they want the
Republican Party to be a wholly owned subsidiary of the Christian Coa-
lition." '246 Surely the Social Gospelers, who had asked their followers to
occupy "the strategic positions . . . [of] Government [which would
serve] as the key to all social reforms and the Christianization of soci-
ety" '247 would applaud these efforts, if not the goals.
In contrast, the (mostly) liberal New Religionists hope to make
global political change by tweaking the Supreme Court's religious juris-
prudence and engaging in dialogue. To the extent, however, that the
critics seek post-Smith doctrinal modifications they want to have their
cake-accommodations-and eat it too, without interest-group politics.
Moreover, they want the courts to step in and reverse legislators and
executives who refuse to grant permissible exemptions from general
laws. Thus, Professor Gedicks, failing to acknowledge fully the neces-
sary relationship between Smith and Amos, lauds the latter decision 248 _
which accommodated the Mormon Church's desire to hire only the
faithful, even for janitorial services in a recreation center-and con-
demns the former. 249 Similarly, Professor Carter welcomes the separate
opinion of Justice Brennan in Amos, which recognized a constitutional
right to religious institutional self-identification, stating that Justice
Brennan "got the point right. '250 By contrast, in the context of critiqu-
ing Professor Sullivan's distinction between Amos and Smith, he
denounces the latter for its insufficient understanding of religious auton-
omy. 25 1 Had the Court come to such an understanding, it would yield a
legal principle similar to the following:
[C]entral acts of faith of a religious community-the aspects that do
the most to produce shared meaning within the corporate body of
worship-are entitled to the highest solicitude by the courts, and,
therefore, when infringing on those central acts, the state must offer a
very convincing reason. As the acts of faith that the state seeks to
245. Arthur Jones, Coalition Wants to Dominate GOP, NAT'L CATH. REP., Sept. 22, 1995, at 5
(alteration in original).
246. Id.
247. See FirNE, supra note 194, at 181 (quoting JOHN R. COMMONS, SOCIAL REFORM AND THE
CHURCH (1894)).
248. Frederick Mark Gedicks, Toward a Constitutional Jurisprudence of Religious Group
Rights, 1989 Wis. L. Rnv. 99, 103.
249. See supra text accompanying note 134.
250. CARTER, supra note 8, at 141.
251. Id. at 141-45.
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regulate or forbid become less central, the state's burden of justifica-
tion grows less.252
At the same time, the courts should not dismiss out of hand an argument
from a church "that considers the repair of the sink God's work." '253
One need not characterize Smith as reflecting the belief that "reli-
gion is a taste or preference that people will affect in order to take
advantage of an exemption from general law" 254 to find fault with either
the Smith decision or Professor Carter's reaction to it. First, the fault
with Smith is not with its invitation to lobby. Rather, its problems are
two-fold: At the deepest level, the Court (a) evinced a distressingly thin
understanding of the nature of the religion clauses and, in so doing, (b)
reflected profound insensitivity to minority religions.
The debate over the meaning of the religion clauses is far too vast a
subject for this essay, but commentators should agree that one of their
purposes is clear: to maintain varying religious traditions, or no tradi-
tion at all. 255 All of the framers of the religion clauses must have sub-
scribed to at least one unstated premise underlying both the interdiction
against establishments and the prohibition on interference with free
exercise, and that is the value of and need to preserve individual differ-
ences. Without this premise, the language of the clauses makes no
sense. The anti-establishment provision, for example, becomes incoher-
ent if its proponents either desired, or were disposed to permit, a single-
minded national (and later state-supported) religious regime. Although
this observation partakes of tautology, it is not thereby rendered mean-
ingless. It does emphasize the unstated presupposition of difference.
Similarly, the provision demanding the dominion of free exercise for-
feits some of its logic unless the drafters recognized and desired to retain
and encourage individual religious difference; a prohibition on free exer-
cise loses a great deal of its meaning in a nation dedicated to universal
establishment. Thus, at the most profound level Smith disobeys the con-
stitutional commandment of religious difference.256
252. Id. at 143.
253. Id. On this reading, it is difficult to determine if Amos was correctly or incorrectly
decided.
254. See supra note 134.
255. McConnell, Free Exercise, supra note 127, at 1140 n.3 (suggesting that the Smith Court,
instead of requiring intent akin to that applied equal protection race-based claims, which begin
with the recognition of racial difference and move to similarity, should have analogized to the
Americans with Disabilities Act, which begins with the recognition of differences and seeks to
accommodate them).
256. What makes this observation all the more interesting (and distressing) is that the opinion
is written by Justice Scalia, an ardent proponent of "plain meaning." See generally Antonin
Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. Ctu. L. REv. 1175 (1989)(advocating "plain
meaning" approach as method of arriving at a "general rule of law"). Scalia blithely dismisses the
interpretive issue in Smith, concluding without analysis that "we do not think the words . ..
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In its disobedience Smith projects a fundamental insensitivity to
non-mainstream religious groups. For one who purports to rely on his-
tory and tradition, 25 as well as precedent,258 to resolve constitutional
disputes, Justice Scalia's concluding remarks in Smith are dumb-
founding: "It may fairly be said that leaving accommodation to the
political process will place at a relative disadvantage those religious
practices that are not widely engaged in; but [this is an] unavoidable
consequence of democratic government .... ,259 That conclusion would
be relatively unexceptionable under two circumstances: (a) if the Con-
stitution contained no First Amendment, or (b) we were a direct democ-
racy. Under such circumstances, all accommodations of any sort would
reside with legislative grace and executive willingness to enforce the
law. But precedent and history tell us something very different,
instructing that when the government puts individuals to the unthinkable
choice of following religious scruple or following the law, it must
demonstrate a compelling reason for so doing. 26° The Court told us
nearly fifty years ago with unanimity that government "can pass [no]
laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over
another.' 26 1 This position was adopted for reasons that persist: to
"secure[ ] religious liberty from invasion of the civil authority. 26 2
This historic understanding does not require the judiciary to mea-
sure the "centrality" of the infringed upon act of faith, as Professor
Carter recommends. On the one hand, it is difficult to imagine any liti-
gation practice more unseemly than qualifying theologians as experts
under the Federal Rules of Evidence, thereby rendering them "compe-
tent" to opine on religious centrality. But worse than unseemliness is
either the misguided allocation of the burden of proof that the proposal
requires, or the extent to which such a practice would demean religion if
'prohibiting the free exercise' must be given [a] meaning" that recognizes the impermissibility of
laws that effectively-but not intentionally-make religious exercise impossible. Employment
Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878 (1990). On Justice Scalia's
interpretive approach to First Amendment and Religion issues see generally Michael J. Gerhardt,
A Tale of Two Textualists: A Critical Comparison of Justices Black and Scalia, 74 B.U. L. REv.
25, 48-51 (1994) and Eric J. Segall, Justice Scalia, Critical Legal Studies, and the Rule of Law, 62
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 991, 1010-11 (1994).
257. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 632 (1992) (Scalia J., dissenting) (arguing that
the majority rejected "the historic practices of our people").
258. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 557 (1993)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (asserting that Smith rested in part on past precedent).
259. Smith, 494 U.S. at 889.
260. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbet v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
261. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947). Accord id. at 22 (Jackson, J.,
dissenting); id. at 28-29 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
262. Everson, 330 U.S. at 15 (quoting Harmon v. Dreher, 17 S.C. Eq. (Speer's Eq.) 87, 120
(1843) (quoted with approval in Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 730 (1871)).
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the burden were retained by the state. Further, if the religious conduct at
issue were not "central," the courts would be left adrift to determine the
inverse relationship between conduct centrality and state justification.
On this score-and only this score-would Justice Scalia triumph:
"What principle of law or logic can be brought to bear to contradict a
believer's assertion that a particular act is 'central' to his personal
faith?"2 3 Moreover, what judge or jury can determine which set of
competing expert theological testimony is to be followed? The problem
with the compelling interest test that reigned prior to Smith is not with
the test, but with the Court's unwillingness to apply it faithfully.
V. IN CONCLUSION: A VERY BRIEF AND TENTATIVE EXCURSUS ON
DIALOGUE WITHOUT TRIUMPHALISM OR
THEOLOGICAL RELATIVISM
An ancient Hasidic tale tells of an elderly Eastern European Rabbi
who, shortly after one of the emperor's periodic pogroms had wiped out
hundreds of Jews in the area, addressed his congregation during a High
Holy Day Shabbot service. Standing before the congregation, he raised
his head and arms toward Adonai and cried out in pain:
Adonai, what have we done to make you so angry? How have
we broken your covenant? Why have so many of us been taken?
Please, Adonai, if it will help, if it will stop our suffering and bleed-
ing, speak to us now, tell us what to do, for the pain we now feel will
bear no further losses. Please, Adonai, if I have made you angry, take
my life that others of our people might be spared.
Of course, the story goes, God made no response: Ours is to do and not
to know, to pray and not to lead.264 As the theologian Michael Goldberg
points out, the climax of the Exodus narrative "is not a Declaration of
Independence at Philadelphia, but a binding covenant at Sinai. In this
narrative, ... the Israelites go from being the servants of the Egyptians
to being the servants of God. '2 65 This is where I come from.
The cultural battles we now witness are not about the marginaliza-
tion of religion in American politics. As Stanley Fish points out, the
Enlightenment is over "and religion lost. '266 Contrary to traditional lib-
eral tenets, which consign many of our most cherished concerns to the
private sphere, we are today in danger of being overwhelmed by public
religiosity, even though for many of the New Religionists, the type of
263. Smith, 494 U.S. at 887.
264. 1 am thankful to my friend and former Rabbi, Uri Goren, Temple Beth Israel, Macon,
Georgia for this story.
265. MicHAEL GOLDBERG, JEWS AND CHRISTIANS: GETTINo OUR STORIES STRAIGHT 31 (985).
266. Fish, supra note 117, at 26.
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religion that now dominates public life is simply wrong. From this per-
spective, the issue is about politics and power, plain and simple. The
new Battle of Armageddon is about control: it pits the liberal agenda of
most New Religionists against the conservative agenda of the New
Right; both proclaim a "New Social Gospel," although only the latter is
willing to undertake the public work this gospel requires.
From a different perspective, however, one might ask why we
should engage in an ecumenical political dialogue at all? In a nation
where private activity is still the predominant form, it cannot be that the
only itinerary which leads to transcendence runs through public political
discourse. Why should we not engage one another in ecumenical theo-
logical discourse? Would we not all be better served if we found com-
mon theological grounds for finding a national transcendent norm and
perhaps a common source of humility? Would we not be richer as a
political culture if we at least begin the journey to transcendence by
heeding Professor Hauerwas' counsel: "[W]hat more important public
service can we render than to pray that the emperor recognize his or her
status as a creature of God[?]" 26
Whether such a dialogue is-or ever was-possible is an open
question. It is hard to imagine a theological synthesis that accords full
respect for the variety of revelations, without collapsing into a theologi-
cal relativism which undermines the importance of revelation generally.
For if one revelation is equal to another, none has any unique value.268
And if we cannot create such a synthesis, there arises the necessity to
combat the wholly paternalistic brand of tolerance known as Triumphal-
ism. In the end, we may be too far removed from genuine religion to
overcome the essential gnosticism that pervades American Religion. 269
But between the two poles of relativism and Triumphalism lies tension.
If we are to create the national transcendence necessary to restore or
recreate a sense of ourselves as a moral people, we must find a way to
embrace the tension and use its energy creatively. Clearly, that will be
no mean feat.
267. HAUERWAS, supra note 187, at 126.
268. NOVAK, supra note 3, at 17.
269. Jesus is not so much an event in history for the American Religionists as he is a
knower of the secrets of God who in return can be known by the individual. Hidden
in this process is a sense that depravity is only a lack of saving knowledge.
Salvation, through knowing the knowing Jesus, is a reversal wholly experiential in
nature, an internalization of a self already internalized.
HAROLD BLOOM, THE AMERICAN RELIGION: THE EMERGENCE OF THE POST-CHRISTIAN NATION 65
(1992).
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